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Emerging WTO Competition
Jurisprudence and its Possibilities for

Future Development

Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez

*

A new competition jurisprudence is emerging within the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") and its Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). This
jurisprudence first emerged with the WTO Panel's ("Panel") decision in
Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper,1 and
continued with the Panel's and Appellate Body's ("AB") astonishing
reports in United States - Anti-DumpingAct of 19162 and the Panel report in
Argentina - Measures
Affecting the Export of Bovine Hide and the Import of
3

FinishedLeather.
The forthcoming

Panel

report, Mexico

-

Measures Affecting

Telecommunications Services will continue this trend.4
At first, this new jurisprudence may appear odd, given that the WTO
framework lacks a complete set of rules for competition matters. However,
the way the Panel and the AB expanded the scope of WTO law over a
domestic antitrust issue in United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, and
the statements made by the Panel regarding trade and competition within
* Universidad de la Sabana; LL.M, McGill University; Partner ARTIFICE, Legal
Division.
I Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R
(Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Film Report].
2 United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter
Act Panel Report]; United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R &
WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Act AB Report]. Both Reports discussed
together will hereinafter be referred to as the Act Decisions. There was another decision
regarding the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 rendered by the same members of the firstmentioned Panel in a claim raised by Japan. See WT/DS 162/R (May 29, 2000).
3 WTO Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the
Import of Finished Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS 155/R (Dec. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Bovine
Hides Report]. This Panel report had another component regarding a violation of Article
111(2), which is not relevant for the purposes of this paper.
4 Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/3 (Feb. 18,
2002) [hereinafter Telecommunications Case].
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the WTO,5 indicate that WTO competition cases may have some hope of
success in spite of current WTO limitations. Indeed, the Act Decisions are
almost unquestionably activist rulings. These decisions portend the growth
of a new approach concerning competition and trade. This approach
suggests that the general principle of self-restraint regarding competition
and trade established by the Film Report may have some exceptions. In
fact, the development of a more developed WTO competition jurisprudence
is underway.
It is important to note that the Panel's and AB's activism in the Act
Decisions does not signal the disappearance of the WTO policy of selfrestraint, which has existed since the Film Report. Neither is it the rule that
competition matters will be decided with the activist orientation of the Act
rulings. Rather, the Panel and the AB will be very cautious. Indeed,
sophisticated adjudicators and skillful diplomats such as those sitting on
WTO Panels and the AB, would not make the mistake of exerting flagrant
activism on an issue as sensitive as competition and trade-an issue for
more than five decades-without initiating serious negotiations. 6 WTO
adjudicators know first hand that its members would not tolerate such a
high level of activism regarding competition.7 Thus, WTO Panels and the
AB will not be providing solutions to all kinds of international competition
issues because the new approach is not oriented toward such a goal.
For the sake of clarity, it is important to define what WTO competition
jurisprudence means. Here, WTO competition jurisprudence refers to WTO
Panels and AB decisions where: (1) members are forced to prevent the
existence of, or attenuate the effects of, a certain private anti-competitive
behavior; 8 (2) members are obliged to ensure that their private companies

' See infra Part III.A.7.
6 In 1948, the Havana Charter attempted to include special provisions on competition
issues adversely affecting international trade. However, the U.S. Congress objected to the
Havana Charter, and the creation of the International Trade Organization ("ITO") was
halted, although the trading system continued under the GATT provisions. For material
discussing the Havana Charter, see Robert R. Wilson, Proposed ITO Charter, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 879 (1947) and George Bronz, The International Trade OrganisationCharter, 62
HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1949).
7 Most likely, excessive activism on competition matters by Panels and the AB would
raise serious allegations regarding the lawfulness of the respective reports on the basis that
they impose new rights and obligations on WTO members, a result expressly banned by
Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"). In addition, such a
degree of activism could lead Members to go so far as to make use of the mechanism of
interpretation of the WTO covered agreements set forth in Articles IX(2) and IX(5) of the
WTO Agreement in order to overrule the interpretations of WTO law contained in the given
rulings. Undoubtedly, such an overruling would seriously impair the institutional reputation
of WTO Panels and the AB, a consequence that the latter specifically would want to prevent.
8 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3.
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will behave in the pro-competition way prescribed by WTO law; 9 (3) WTO
law is stretched to cover a domestic antitrust issue; 1° and (4) Panels and AB
reports deny a WTO solution for an antitrust situation."' In sum, WTO
competition jurisprudence comprises all Panel and AB rulings in cases
where what is debated is the existence of a private anti-competitive
behavior, the absence of the private competitive conduct that WTO law
orders, or certain subject matters that fall within the traditional scope of
domestic antitrust legislation, regardless of whether or not the decision
provides a WTO solution.12
Part II of this article presents the WTO self-restraint approach
regarding competition and trade before the new millennium, as set out in
the Film Report. Part III attempts to untangle the new activist approach
from the Panel and AB decision in United States - Anti-Dumping Act of
1916. Part IV postulates that the development of a WTO jurisprudence
openly protecting private parties' interests may be behind the new
orientation. Part V posits that WTO competition jurisprudence evolves
under the tension between the approaches in the Film Report and in the
Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Part VI analyzes the Bovine Hides Report, Part
VII draws on the Act, the Bovine Hides Report, and on the new competition
dispute, the Telecommunications Case, to present a detailed picture of the
possibilities for the development of WTO competition jurisprudence. Part
VIII evaluates the Telecommunications Case initiated by the United States
to open up the Mexican telecommunications sector, in light of past WTO
competition jurisprudence. Part IX concludes.
First, however, it is necessary to specify to what the Act and the Film
Report approaches refer. The Film Report approach refers to a disposition
to interpret WTO law and jurisprudence in order not to provide a WTO
solution for a competition problem. The Act approach, in contrast, signifies
a readiness to interpret WTO law in a way that grants a WTO remedy to a
competition dispute.

9 This is at issue in the Telecommunications Cases, supranote 4.
10The Act rulings exemplify this type of WTO competition jurisprudence. See supra
note 3.
11Film Report, supra note 2.
12Clearly, WTO law does not create rights or obligations for private persons or
undertakings. Therefore, when WTO competition jurisprudence provides a WTO solution
for a competition situation, it is based on a finding that a Member state, not a private
company, is violating WTO law. However, this is not to say that this jurisprudence is
irrelevant for the private sphere; if a violation of WTO law is declared to exist, these private
undertakings will find that the most likely way in which the Member state will implement
the recommendations or rulings of the DSB is by forcing them to change their behavior.
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II. BEFORE 2000: SELF-RESTRAINT ON COMPETITION AND TRADE

The Film Report set a new tone for competition and trade disputes in
the WTO by placing a heavy burden of proof on the use of the nonviolation complaint of Article XIII(1)(b) of the GATT 1994 as a mechanism

for solving competition cases. 13 In that dispute,the United States alleged
that the combined actions of the Japanese government and the anticompetitive Japanese film industries prevented U.S. companies from
entering the Japanese market. U.S. companies should 4have been permitted
into the market because of the successive trade rounds.'
The Panel in the Film Report15 stringently interpreted Article
XIII(1)(b). 16 Indeed, the Panel narrowed the likelihood of using this
provision, 17 in particular against private anti-competitive practices. 18 In this
case, the Panel imposed a heavy burden of proof on claiming member
states, which have to provide "a detailed justification" that would:
address three issues:

(1) whether the practices in question were

13The relevant part of this Article provides:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of...
b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, ... the contracting party may, with a
view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or
proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.
Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the
representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable period of time,.., the matter may be referred to the contracting party. The
contracting party shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned,
or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate....
14 See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 476 (2d ed. 1999).
15 The Film Report has been the subject of broad analysis that will not be duplicated here.
See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333
(1999).
16 Before the Film Report, there existed within GATT jurisprudence other, more flexible
trends under which the "non-violation or impairment concept also protects the broader
balance of benefits that governments had a right to expect as a result of the reciprocal
undertakings to observe the obligations in the GATT itself." Sung-joon Cho, GATT Non
Violations Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the Achilles Heel of the Dispute
Settlement Process?39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 317 (1998).
17See infra text accompanying note 89.
18See Trachtman, infra note 29 and accompanying text.

Emerging WTO CompetitionJurisprudence

24:441 (2004)
government 'measures;'

(2) if so, whether the measure in question

related to a benefit reasonably anticipated to accrue from prior tariff
concessions by upsetting the competitive relationship between imports
and domestic products; and (3) whether the benefit accruing to the
complainant state had in fact been nullified or impaired by the measure
in questions (causality).' 9
The Panel in the Film Report almost closed the door for disputes
attempting to require competition through Article XIII(1)(b). Some thought
this would mean an end to the WTO system, given that the WTO
framework does not have a complete set of rules on competition; it has only
This
a reduced number whose content is merely exhortatory.2 °
characteristic has led some scholars to maintain that there is no WTO
2
provision ordering the elimination of private restrictive business practices. 1
Therefore, because of the lack of WTO law and of the restrictions imposed
by the Film Report, some authors envisioned that further
developments in
22
competition and trade by the DSB would be unlikely.
Others commented that any WTO competition jurisprudence would
jeopardize the stability of the DSB. For instance, John Jackson maintains,
"the dispute settlement system cannot and should not carry much of the
weight of formulating new rules... by setting forth norms which carry the
organization into totally new territory such as competition policy...
However, the self-restraint of the Film Report did not reappear with
the arrival of the new millennium, and the Act Decisions set out a new
approach regarding competition and trade.
III. UNITED STATES - ANT1DUMPING ACT OF 1916: THE FIRST INDICATOR OF
24
THE NEW APPROACH TO CERTAIN COMPETITION ISSUES UNDER THE WT0

The Act Decisions, the first of the new millennium relating to
19TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 14, at 447.
20For a classification of WTO competition provisions, see infra, Part VII.A (displaying
that not all WTO competition provisions are exhortatory).

21 See Maria Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practicesin InternationalTrade and
the Role of the World Trade Organization,33 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 137 (1998).

22 See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 15, at 374. ("[T]oday there is no substantial WTO
law relating to domestic competition policy.... Nor are there substantial multilateral
agreements regarding competition or international competition policy.... Therefore, one
cannot expect a "trade and competition" jurisprudence to develop from the Film case. There
is insufficient textual authorization.").
23 JOHN JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO 187 (2000).

24 The objective of the analysis of the Act Decisionsthat follow are not to duplicate other
articles that synthesize what the Panel and the AB stated in this case. The goal here is to
decipher the new approach concerning competition and trade within the WTO by displaying
the arguments and the interpretative techniques employed by the judicial framework of the
DSB in deciding this case.
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competition and trade, set a new and different approach to issues of
competition in the WTO. This new approach complements the self-restraint
orientation of the Film Report. A number of elements show that the Panel
and the AB did not consider self-restraint when deciding the Act Decisions:
(1) the way the Panel and the AB decided the dispute; (2) the interpretative
methods employed to set the scope of the relevant WTO provisions; (3) the
way they handled the travaux pr~paratoire(preparatory documents) of the
applicable WTO precepts; (4) the manner in which the Panel and the AB
narrowed previous rulings so as to avoid their being applied in the Act
Decisions; and (5) the statements made regarding trade and antitrust made
by the Pane125-apparently endorsed by the AB which kept silent about
them on appeal.2 6 Future competition Panels may embrace this approach by
applying some of the ruling's interpretative methods.
27
The Act Decisions indicate that the judicial framework of the DSB
has enough legitimacy to be less conservative regarding competition
matters under certain exceptional circumstances, while maintaining its
traditional prudence when interpreting WTO precepts.
Deciding a
competition case against the United States on WTO legal grounds, would
force the United States to override its domestic antitrust legislation and
disparage its long-lasting determination to oppose any multilateral
competition agreement. 28 Only well-established adjudicators have the
willingness to adopt these determinations. This is why the Act Decisions
are indicative of a different approach to competition and trade.
Since the Act Decisions have opened the door for a more varied WTO
competition jurisprudence, we should not necessarily expect an explosion
of competition rulings.
The development of WTO competition
jurisprudence hinges on many factors not in the hands of Panels or the AB.
Development depends on member states bringing good cases before the
DSB. This complex process occurs within complaining member states and
is dependant upon several circumstances.
First, some member states may have WTO-thematic agendas they wish
to develop through dispute settlement, and within these agendas
competition is only one issue, which may or may not be a priority.
25 See infraPart III.A.7.
26 Act AB Report, supra note 2.

27The judicial framework of the DSB is understood in this paper to mean Panels and the
AB.
28 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm

(last

visited March 5, 2004). However, it is worth mentioning that some developing-country
Members also oppose the inclusion of antitrust issues specifically within the WTO.

29See Joel Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs & Benefits of Private Participation
in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Rights Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (2003)

(providing a complete review of possible WTO strategic litigation).
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Second, while there is no multilateral international agreement on
competition, recent years have seen an increasing number of bilateral
competition agreements aimed at enhancing cooperation between national
antitrust authorities to deal with trans-border competition issues. 30 A
member state interested in drawing on WTO mechanisms to solve an
international competition problem therefore must gauge how WTO
litigation will affect the antitrust cooperation with the defendant member
state. It is possible under some circumstances that the risk of lessening
such bilateral cooperation will prevent some competition cases from being
taken before the WTO DSB. 3 1 Third, WTO litigation responds to the needs
of private industries, so competition cases will never reach the DSB if there
is not an important private interest behind them, able to put pressure on
Member States to trigger the WTO dispute settlement system.32 These
circumstances show that for a competition case to get a WTO Panel
decision the fulfillment of multiple conditions outside the purview of either
the AB or the Panels is necessary.
Despite these hurdles, the circumstances are favorable for some cases
to lead to the development of WTO competition jurisprudence. The U.S.
government opposes the incorporation of competition within the WTO, and
without U.S. support, an agreement would be difficult to achieve.
Therefore, some member states, including the European Union and Japan,
who want to incorporate competition issues within the WTO framework
The United States and the European Union are the leading parties to bilateral
competition agreements. The United States has bilateral treaties with Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Germany, European Union, Israel, Japan, and most recently, Mexico. See
30

ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST COOPERATION AGREEMENTS at

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/intarrangements.htm (last visited March 4,
2004). The European Union has bilateral competition agreements with Canada, Israel,
Moldova, Cyprus, the United States, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Russia, Switzerland,
Turkey and the Ukraine. See EUROPEAN UNION, INTERNATIONAL BILATERAL RELATIONS at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral (last visited March 4, 2004).
31This was not the case with the European Union and Japan regarding the Act Decisions
against the United States.
32The exceptions to this rule are systemic complaints, which are, according to Sevilla,
"those designed to enforce more diffuse interests-for example, the interests of all potential
exporters to a particular country, rather than a specific sector-or are aimed at protecting the
integrity of the rule-based system more generally." Christina Sevilla, ExplainingPatternsof
GA TT/WTO Trade Complaints, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Working
Paper Series 98-01 at 6 (1998) at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/papers/98-0l.pdf. The
possibility of bringing systemic complaints before the DSB was highlighted by the AB in its
report in European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, where it held that Members do not have to demonstrate a legal interest to bring a
case. See European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) at 589 [hereinafter Bananas AB Report].
For an analysis of the consequences of the possibility of bringing systemic disputes over the
whole structure of the DSB, see Yuji Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement as Judicial
Supervision, 5 J. OF INT'L. ECON. L. 287 (2002).
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may present competition cases based on WTO legal grounds before the
DSB. Thus, WTO competition litigation may become an alternative for the
absence of or deadlocked negotiations.
A. Unraveling the Activist Approach of the Act Rulings
The main issue of the Act Decisions case was whether the civil and
criminal penalties contained in the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 that were to
be imposed by U.S. federal courts on persons involved in international
predatory pricing affecting U.S. markets violated Article VI of GATT
199433 and provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.34 The U.S. AntiDumping Act of 1916 provides the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing
any articles from any foreign country into the United States, commonly
and systematically to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such
articles within the United States at a price substantially less than the
actual market value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of
exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country
of their production, or of other foreign countries to which they are
commonly exported after adding to such market value or wholesale
price, freight, duty, and other charges and expenses necessarily incident
to the importation and sale thereof in the United States: Provided,That
such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an
industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an
industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part
of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.
Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person
to violate this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of any
violation of, or combination or conspiracy to violate, this section, may
sue therefore in the district court of the United States for the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
33 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947); WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION,

THE

LEGAL

TEXTS,

THE

RESULTS

OF

THE

URUGUAY

ROUND

OF

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 147 (1999) [hereinafter WTO Legal Texts] at 430.
34 WTO Agreement, supra note 33, Annex 1A; Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (Apr. 15, 1994) [hereinafter AntiDumping Agreement]; WTO Legal Texts, supra note 33.
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to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages
sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive the proper
State courts of jurisdiction in actions for damages thereunder.35
The European Union claimed that:
[T]he objective criteria for determining whether a law is subject to the
disciplines of Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement are (i)
whether the law is targeted at imports, and (ii) whether it defines the
regulated conduct as price discrimination in the form of lower prices in
the market of the importing country than those practiced on the market
of the country of export. On that basis, the 1916 Act is a law which is
subject to Article VI of the GATT 1994 because
I. it is targeted at imports. Its prohibition is directed at 'any person
importing or assisting in importing any articles in the United States.'
Such persons who breach the prohibition are guilty of a misdemeanor,
and are liable for treble damages to persons who are injured by the
prohibited conduct; and
II. The regulated conduct is defined by reference to discrimination
between the price of the imported products and 'the actual market value
or wholesale price of such articles... in the principal markets of the
country of their production,
or of other foreign countries to which they
36
are commonly exported.'
The United States made several arguments, any of which would have
been attractive to the Panel or the AB if they had approached the case with
self-restraint. However, both took an activist stance and declared that the
U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was inconsistent with WTO law. 37 This
activism is uncovered after analyzing the interpretative techniques
employed by the AB and Panel in deciding this case; the methods were all
oriented toward the same objective: incorporating the antitrust issue of
international predatory pricing within the WTO system.38

35 Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2004).
36

Id. 3.82.

37 This result was anticipated by Diane Keppler. See Diane Keppler, The Geneve Steel

Co. Decision Raises Concerns in Geneva: Why the 1916 Antidumping Act Violates the WTO
Antidumping Agreement, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 293 (1999).
38 This article does not suggest that all Panel and AB decisions are result-oriented, but
that the Act rulings were.
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1. NarrowingPrevious Cases and Expanding WTO Rules: Interpretative
Techniques Make ChallengingLegislation under Article VI and the Anti-

Dumping Agreement Possible
The United States attempted to sway the Panel and the AB with the
argument that the legislation could not be challenged under Article VI of
the GATT 1994. The United States argued that only specific measures
adopted in conformity with the given legislation could be matters for WTO
dispute settlement. 39 Therefore, member states should wait for a concrete
application of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 before bringing a case to the
DSB. It would have been easy, under the judicial framework of the DSB, to
accept this argument. Indeed, the Panel or the AB could have used past
4
GATT practice 40 and
42 recent WTO rulings 1 to construct an argument to
support such a view.
However, the AB questioned defense. The AB narrowed Guatemala Cement by maintaining that it did not refer to a discussion of whether
legislation as such could be a subject matter for the DSB to consider within
39 See Act PanelReport, supra note 3, at 3.27.
40 EEC - Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, May 16 1990, GATT B.I.S.D
(37 Supp.) at 132.
41 Guatemala - Anti-dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico,
WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Guatemala - Cement].
42 The United States argued that in EEC - Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components the Panel found that "the mere existence" of the anti-circumvention provision
of the European Communities' anti-dumping legislation was not inconsistent with the
European Communities' GATT 1947 obligations, even though the European Communities
had taken GATT-inconsistent measures under that provision. Additionally, to support its
point, the United States also referred to the AB report in Guatemala - Cement:
Furthermore, Article 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement specifies the types of "measure"
which may be referred as part of a "matter" to the DSB. Three types of anti-dumping
measure are specified in Article 17.4: definitive anti-dumping duties, the acceptance of price
undertakings, and provisional measures. According to Article 17.4, a "matter" may be
referred to the DSB only if one of the relevant three anti-dumping measures is in place. This
provision, when read together with Article 6.2 of the DSU, requires a Panel request in a
dispute brought under the Anti-Dumping Agreement to identify, as the specific measure at
issue, either a definitive anti-dumping duty, the acceptance of a price undertaking, or a
provisional measure. This requirement to identify a specific anti-dumping measure at issue
in a Panel request in no way limits the nature of the claims that may be brought concerning
alleged nullification or impairment of benefits or the impeding of the achievement of any
objective in a dispute under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. As we have observed earlier,
there is a difference between the specific measures at issue-in the case of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, one of the three types of anti-dumping measure described in Article 17.4-and
the claims or the legal basis of the complaint referred to the DSB relating to those specific
measures. In coming to this conclusion, we note that the language of Article 17.4 of the AntiDumping Agreement is unique to that Agreement.
Id.

450

79.
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Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.43 Additionally, the AB
expanded Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement by holding that nowhere within them was that matter excluded
and that, therefore, it must be understood that legislation, and not only the
specific measures against dumping adopted in conformity with the
legislation, could be a subject for DSB consideration.
2.

The Distinction between Mandatory andDiscretionaryLegislation

The United States also argued that the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 is,
discretionary, not mandatory, legislation because it does not mandate
actions inconsistent with the WTO regime.45 It was quite easy for the Panel
and the AB to reject this argument given that, as the European
Communities 46 demonstrated, within GATT and WTO practice, only
legislation that provides the executive branch of member states with
discretion can be considered discretionary; the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916
in effect confers discretion primarily on the judicial branch of the United
States. Therefore, although the Justice Department had discretion to bring a
case under the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, such discretion was not
considered sufficient to transform the Act into discretionary legislation.47
Intertwined with the issue of mandatory/discretionary legislation was
the United States' argument that the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 did not
violate the WTO regime owing to the possibility of its being interpreted by
U.S. courts in a manner abiding by this legal order. 4
3. NarrowingPast WTO Jurisprudence: The Interpretative Technique
Used to Reject the Argument of the Possibilityof Interpretingthe Act in a
WTO-Consistent Manner
The United States argued that even if legislation could violate Article
VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 did
not do so, because it was possible for it to be interpreted in a WTOconsistent fashion by U.S. courts. Therefore, the Anti-Dumping Act of
1916 did not mandate actions inconsistent with the WTO. 4 9 The United
States based its argument on United States - Measures Affecting the
Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco a report that assigned a
43 See Act AB Report, supra note 2,
44 See id. 62.

72.

45 See Act PanelReport, supra note 2,

3.26.
46 The expression "European Communities" is used in Article XI of the WTO Agreement
to refer to the "European Union." Both monikers are used in this article.
47 See id 6.169; Act AB Report, supra note 2, 91.
48 See Act PanelReport, supra note 2, 3.32.
49
See id. 6.85.
50 See United States - Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of
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heavy burden of proof on claimants, forcing them to demonstrate that it was
impossible to interpret the provision in a way respectful of the WTO. l
Again, however the Panel's activist approach led it to reject the United
States' reasoning. The Panel narrowed the scope of the Tobacco Case by
establishing a basic difference from the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916
situation.

[I]n the United States - Tobacco case, the Panel had to deal with the
question whether the ambiguous term at issue mandated a violation of
Article VIII of the GATT 1947. In the present case, what is at issue is
whether the terms of the 1916 Act are such as to make Article VI
applicable to that law. We are consequently at an earlier stage of our
analysis than the Panel in the United States - Tobacco case...
consequently, the situations faced by this Panel and the Panel in the
United States - Tobacco case are factually different
These differences have implications for the burden of proof...

The change to the burden of proof was dramatic:
[I]t is not necessary for the EC to demonstrate that there was no court
decision that applied the 1916 Act in a WTO-consistent manner. If we
find that the US court practice is not sufficiently well established, or that
there is no prevailing interpretation, or no sufficiently clear reasoning
regarding the way the transnational price discrimination test of the 1916
Act should be applied, we shall rely on the text of the law itself.
However, for the United States to prevail, it would be sufficient in our
view to 5 show
that there is one definitive interpretation supporting its
3

position.

This allocation of the burden of proof proved to be too onerous for the
United States, because there was no definite judicial interpretation showing
that the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was applied in a way that escaped the
disciplines of Article VI of the GATT 1994. Thus, the Panel determined
that the United States failed to prove this defense,5 4 a conclusion that was
endorsed by the AB. 55 If the Panel and the AB had practiced self-restraint
in this case, they could have used the argument of possible WTO-consistent
interpretations of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 as a mechanism to show
deference to the United States and to avoid the expansion of the WTO over
Tobacco, GATT B.I.S.D. (41 Supp.) at 131 (1994) [hereinafter Tobacco Case].
51See Act PanelReport, supra note 2, T 6.85.
52 Id.
6.86 -. 87.

SId. 6.135.
14

See id.

55 See Act AB Report, supranote 2,

97.
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U.S. legislation condemning international predatory pricing.
4. HighlightingSimilaritiesand DiminishingDifferences: The
InterpretativeStrategy to IncorporateInternationalPredatoryPricing
within the Concept of Dumping
The central issue in the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 dispute was
whether Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement applied to national
antitrust legislation condemning international predatory pricing. The
European Communities argued that they did. However, the United States
contested the application of the foregoing WTO precepts over the AntiDumping Act of 1916 because there was a difference between the two
concepts-specifically, that it was more difficult to prove the existence of
predatory pricing than that of dumping. 6 This was true because in
establishing the presence of predatory pricing, it was necessary to prove (1)
the intent to destroy or injure an industry in the United States,5 7 (2) that the
price difference was "substantial," and, (3) that the importation was
common and systematic 58-requirements not contemplated to prove the
existence of dumping. The United States also argued that the AntiDumping Act of 1916 had an antitrust objective, which made it different
from anti-dumping
legislation; therefore, it could not be covered by the
5
WTO regime.
If the Panel and the AB had been restrained, they would have
highlighted the disparities between dumping and international predatory
pricing and concluded that they were not equivalent. Therefore, the AntiDumping Act of 1916 would have fallen outside the WTO framework. In
the end, there was little room for complaint, because when the WTO and
the Anti-Dumping Agreement were negotiated, no one expected that they
would be applied to legislation condemning international predatory pricing,
an issue
that traditionally had fallen within the scope of domestic antitrust
60
law.

Nevertheless, the Panel and the AB did not approach the case with
self-restraint. Both decided that the essential element of dumping is the:
price difference between like products sold in two markets, one of which
is not within the jurisdiction of the same member, their price in the
country of exportation being lower than their price in the country of

56 See Act Panel Report,supra note 2,

3.89

" See id.

58 See id.

3.90.
See id. 6.10.
60 See infra Part I1l.A.6, analyzing the negotiating history of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
59
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production or in a third country to which they are exported.6 1
Any practice that possesses this element is "dumping." The Panel stated:
This test [of the Act] includes requirements similar to the introduction of
the dumped product into the commerce of one Member since it refers to
"import or sell or cause to be imported or sold... within the United
States." We further note that the 1916 Act is premised on a comparison
between two prices, one in the United States, the other one in the
country of production of the product or in a third country where the
product is also sold. There is consequently a very strong similarity
between the definition of dumping in Article VI and the transnational
price discrimination test found in the 1916 Act.
This said, would there be elements in the text of the 1916 Act that would
lead us to conclude that the trans-national price discrimination test in the
1916 Act nevertheless does not meet the definition of dumping in
Article VI? We note that the 1916 Act relies not only on the actual
market value but also on wholesale price. It also refers to the "principal
markets of the country of... production [of the imported merchandise]"
or of "other foreign countries to which they are commonly exported."
We do not find the nature of these requirements to be different from
those of Article VI: 1 to such a degree as to make them fall outside the
concept of "comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the
like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country"
found in Article VI:l(a). The 1916 Act also refers to sales on the
"principal markets" of "other foreign countries to which they are
commonly exported." This may not be the "highest comparable price
for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course
of trade" found in Article VI: l(b) but, once again, its nature does not, in
our view, depart to a significant degree from the criteria of Article VI: I
and it does not relate to other concepts which, by their nature, could be
differentiated from those found in Article VI: 1. Finally, we note that the
1916 Act does not provide for the possibility to use a "constructed"
normal value, within the meaning of Article VI: I (b)(ii). However, this
only makes the transnational price discrimination test in the 1916 Act
"narrower" than the definition of "dumping" in Article VI: 1, without
making it fall outside its scope. We also note that the 1916 Act provides
for adjustments. Even though these adjustments are not those found in
the last sub-paragraph of Article VI: 1, they do not affect the scope of the
price discrimination test in the 1916 Act in relation to Article VI. On
the contrary, they confirm the similarity of the two texts as far as the
criteria for the identification of the practice at issue is concerned.62

61
62

See Act PanelReport, supra note 2,
Id. 6.108-09.

6.104.
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The AB endorsed this conclusion by noting the following:
On the basis of the wording of the 1916 Act, it is clear that the 1916 Act
provides for civil and criminal proceedings and penalties when persons
import products from another country into the territory of the United
States, and sell or offer such products for sale at a price less than the
price for which the like products are sold or offered for sale in the
country of export or, in certain cases, a third country market. In other
words, in the light of the definition of "dumping" set out in ArticleVI: I
of the GATT 1994, as elaborated in Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, the civil and criminal proceedings and penalties
contemplated by the 1916 Act require the presence of the constituent
elements of "dumping." The constituent elements of "dumping" are
built into the essential elements of civil and criminal liability under the
1916 Act. The wording of the 1916 Act also makes clear that these
actions can be taken only with respect to conduct that presents the
constituent elements of "dumping." It follows that the civil and criminal
proceedings and penalties provided for in the 1916 Act are "specific
action against dumping." We find, therefore, that Article VI of the
GATT 1994 applies to the 1916 Act.63
Once the Panel and the AB reached the conclusion that the AntiDumping Act of 1916 was directed at dumping, 64 all the differences
between dumping and international predatory pricing as defined in the Act,
and the civil and criminal consequences, became violations of Article VI
and of Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Among the differences
that the Panel declared WTO-inconsistent were the possibility for
individuals, not industries, to sue in civil courts for international predatory
pricing 65 and the possibility to start the civil process due to
an offer or the
sole existence of intent, without the occurrence of an injury.6 6
5. Anti-Dumping Measures Are the Only Measures that Member States
May Adopt Against Dumping
The United States argued that, even if the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916
was directed at dumping, it was not contrary to the WTO regime because
Article VI(2) of the GATT 1994 provides that member states may adopt

63

ActAB Report, supra note 2,

130.

64 Even the cost recoupment criterion, by which in addition to intent of injuring it was
necessary to prove that there was a likelihood of recoupment of the losses due to the
international predatory pricing, elaborated by Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 509. U.S. 209 (1993), was rejected as a difference that would have led to the
exclusion of the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 from the scope of Article VI of the GATT 1994
and of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. See Act Panel Report, supra note 2, 6.151.
65 See id. 6.213-.214.
66 See id. 6.180.
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anti-dumping measures when dumping is proved within the given
investigation.67 This would mean that member states could take other
measures, such as the civil and criminal ones contemplated by the Act.
However, the Panel and the AB did not give in to this argument. Instead,
they upheld the European Communities' legal construction. Under this
interpretation, Article VI(2) applies to Article 18(1) of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, so that the term "may" refers exclusively to the Member States'
right to impose anti-dumping measures up to the level of the margin of
dumping, or to impose measures up to a level that eliminates the injury to
the respective national industry.6
Thus, member states could combat
dumping only with anti-dumping measures.
6. Ignoring the NegotiatingHistory ofArticle VI of the GATT, and
Emphasis on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention: Strategies to Deal with
the Travaux Pr~paratoire
The United States invoked the legislative history of the GATT and the
WTO to support its arguments. First, the United States contended that the
7
68

See id.

3.218-.219.

The Act Panel said:

In Article VI:2, the only term the meaning of which is actually debated by the parties is the
verb "may." The ordinary meanings of the verb "may" as an auxiliary verb include "have
ability or power to, can" Taken on its own, this verb could mean that Members have the
possibility only to impose duties or that they have a choice between duties and other types of
measures. If the word "may" was used in the first meaning, it could be argued that the term
"only" should have been added right after it so as to limit its meaning. However, such an
argument disregards the immediate context of the word "may." The terms "in order to offset
or prevent dumping" set up the framework in which the term "may" must be understood. By
specifying that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to "offset" dumping, not to impose
punitive measures, Article VI:2, first sentence, limits the meaning of the word "may" to
giving Members the choice between a duty equal to the dumping margin and a lower duty,
not between anti-dumping duties and other measures....

In substance, we consider that the provisions of Articles I and 18.1 limit the anti-dumping
instruments that may be used by Members to those expressly contained in Article VI and the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Except for provisional measures and price undertakings, the only
type of measures foreseen by the Anti-Dumping Agreement is the imposition of duties. We
also note that Article 9.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement establishes an intimate link
between the calculation of a dumping margin provided for in Article 2 of the Agreement and
the final measures that may be imposed. We therefore conclude that the context of Article
VI confirms the provisional conclusion we had reached on the basis of the ordinary meaning
of that provision.

See id.
6.189 and 6.196. This reasoning was endorsed by the AB. See Act AB Report,
supra note 2,
114-24.
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demise of the Havana Charter, with its antitrust provisions, and later, the
1960 Decision on Arrangements for Consultation on Restrictive Business
Practices69 which explicitly recognized that antitrust issues were not
addressed under the GATT, were proof that issues like international
predatory pricing contemplated by national legislation were outside the
scope of the GATT and the WTO.7 Second, the United States cited the
negotiating history of Article VI, including the GATT 1947, the Havana
Charter, and its evolution through the Tokyo Round to the WTO, to try to
argue that Article VI had not stipulated that anti-dumping measures
were
71
the only ones Member States could adopt to counteract dumping.
Again, if the Panel and the AB had exerted self-restraint in this case,
they would have acknowledged the negotiating history of the GATT, as it
does not expressly provide that international predatory pricing be covered
by the anti-dumping precepts of the GATT 1994 and the WTO. However,
the Panel and the AB went far in interpreting Article VI and the AntiDumping Agreement, and obviously, they could not do that by grounding
their arguments on the detailed legislative history.
The ways in which the Panel and the AB dealt with the historical
interpretation of the WTO provisions in this case display their activist
approach. First, when the Panel and the AB evaluated whether the AntiDumping Act of 1916 was directed at a practice that contained the
constitutive elements of dumping, they ignored the negotiating history; they
never even explained how they would go about expanding Article VI of
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement to cover the issue of
international predatory pricing, despite the failure of the Havana Charter
and the existence of the decision stating that competition matters, in
principle, are not part of the WTO.72 In sum, by ignoring the intention of
the parties, both the Panel and the AB eschewed the problem of the
legislative history.
This, though, was not the only strategy employed by the Panel and the
AB. Concerning the second matter-whether anti-dumping measures were
the only ones permitted by the drafters of the WTO to counteract
dumping-the Panel made use of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
Article 31 calls for the use of the travaux pr~paratoire when the
interpretation of the text of a treaty is unclear. Thus, the Panel's decision
was to attenuate the importance of the negotiating history in this case by
69 GATT Resolutions, B.I.S.D. 28 (9th Supp.) (1961).
70 See Act PanelReport, supra note 2,
3.70-.7 1.
71See id. $T 3.233-.237.
72 The 1960 Decision is now part of the GATT/1 994. Indeed, the introductory note of the
GATT 1994 states in 1(b)(iv) that "1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
('GATT 1994') shall consist of... (b)(iv) other decisions of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to GATT 1947." WTO Legal Texts, supranote 33, at 17.
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stating:
[I]f necessary to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
Article 31 or to determine the meaning when the interpretation under
Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to results
manifestly absurd or unreasonable, we may have recourse to the
supplementar means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention.
The Panel held that since its interpretation of Article VI was clear, it
was not necessary to confirm it through an extensive use of the travaux
prdparatoireof the WTO provisions of the case:
However, the Panel analyzed one specific document, the Report of the
Working Party on Modifications to the General Agreement, which was
adopted by the Contracting Parties on September 1-2, 1948, and
embraced the interpretation of it that supported its finding based on the
text of the provisions.74
The AB applied the same interpretative technique regarding this issue
by stating:
The United States argues, on the basis of the history of this provision,
that the phrase "anti-dumping measure" refers only to definitive antidumping duties, price undertakings and provisional measures. However,
the ordinary meaning of the phrase "an anti-dumping measure" seems to
encompass all measures taken against dumping. We do not see in the
words "an anti-dumping measure" any explicit limitation to particular
types of measure.75
In other words, if the interpretation of the text of the relevant GATT
1994 or WTO provisions expanding the WTO to certain antitrust issues is
considered to be clear by the judicial framework of the DSB, the
interpretation can disregard intense debates over the negotiating history as
73 Act Panel Report, supra note 2, at
provides:

6.187; Article 32 of the Vienna Convention

Supplementary means of interpretation.
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
when interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous; or (b) leads
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

7 See id.

6.201-.203.

75 Act AB Report, supra note 2,

119.
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an argument opposing such expansion. Thus, both the Panel and the AB
gave a clear prevalence to the interpretation of the text of the relevant
provisions of the case rather than its historical background.7 6
7.

The Ratification of the Activism of the Act Rulings: Panels' Remarks
andAB's Silences Pave the Way to Less Self-Restraint on the Issue of
Competition Within the WTO

Not only did the Panel take an activist stance when solving the Act
case, it also declared openly that domestic antitrust law and restrictive
business practices can be covered by WTO provisions. The Panel held that:
[T]he mere description or categorization of a measure under the
domestic law as well as the policy purpose behind the measure cannot
be a decisive77 factor in the categorization of that measure under the WTO
Agreement.

We note that, in any event, the scope of the WTO Agreement does not
exclude a priori restrictive business practices. Thus, the fact that the
1916 Act would be an antitrust law would not per se be sufficient to
exclude the application of WTO rules to that law. We note that Panels
under GATT 1947 and the WTO have addressed various aspects of
restrictive business practices initiated by governments when such
practices had the effect of impeding market access of foreign products or
entry of foreign enterprises.... Consequently, we do not consider the
dichotomy trade law/antitrust law, to the extent that it would be based on
the assumption that WTO disciplines are not intended to apply to
business restrictive practices, to be a limitation to the application of
WTO rules and disciplines.78
Moreover, the Panel explained that, in the case of any antitrust issue

This determination is entirely consistent with the Vienna Convention, which gives preeminence to the text of treaties over their negotiating history. See, e.g., I. M. Sinclair,
76

Vienna Conference on the Law of the Treaties 19 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 46 (1970); Herbert W.
Briggs, The Travaux Prdparatoires of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 65 AM.
J. INT'L L. 705 (1971). However, the point here is not whether the Panel and the AB acted
lawfully, but how they addressed the legislative history of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Traditionally, the judicial framework of the DSB uses the negotiating history to
confirm its interpretations of legal texts. In terms of interpretation techniques, this means
that when Panels and the AB can make use of the negotiating history to confirm their
interpretation of the relevant texts they do it. Conversely, when the negotiating history does
not support the given interpretation, the judicial framework of the DSB may avoid the
travaux prdparatoiresimply by invoking Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, as it did in
the Act Decisions.
77 Act Panel Report supra note 2, at 6.100.
71 Id. 6.172 n.429.
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coming before the judicial framework of the DSB, the relevant issue should
be whether the contested law is in conformity with the WTO regime.
Whether or not this law constitutes part of the antitrust legislation of the
given defendant should not be considered. Clearly, the Panel wanted to
dilute the antitrust aspect of the case to highlight its WTO perspective. The
Panel stated:
The United States warned the Panel of the implications of an
interpretation of the price discrimination test of Article VI that would be
so broad that it could make Article VI applicable to all antitrust laws
when such laws address situations
of trans-national
price
discrimination....

We recall that we were requested to review the conformity of the 1916
Act with the provisions of the WTO Agreement, not to address the
general issue of the relationship between trade law and antitrust law.79

The AB's silences on appeal about the above statements are
remarkable. First, as to those referring to the possibility of antitrust laws
and restrictive practices as issues before the DSB, if the AB had considered
such statements as having gone too far, it could have used nuance to
attenuate its message. However, the AB remained silent, endorsing them. 80
'9 Id.
6.171-.172. These paragraphs could be viewed as the Panel stating that its
decision is pure trade jurisprudence and that it lacks any competition dimension. Obviously,
the Act Decisions are trade jurisprudence, and nobody would expect the Panel or the AB to
state they are competition decisions. However I will respond to this argument below. See
infra, Part III.A.7.
80 Given that the AB endorsed the Panel report, such silence is another blessing to the
Panel. However, some could argue that this silence is the direct consequence of the fact that
the above-mentioned findings were not appealed, based on what the AB stated in CanadaCertain Measures Concerning Periodicals: "[A] Panel finding that has not been specifically
appealed in a particular case should not be considered to have been endorsed by the
Appellate Body." WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals,WT/DS3 1/AB/R (adopted July 30, 1997) 20 n.28. Although the AB may decide
only issues that have been expressly appealed, trade lawyers know that sometimes the AB
expresses its disagreement with Panel findings which have not been appealed. Perhaps one
of the most telling examples is the AB report in Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile
and Clothing Products. At issue was the question of whether Panels and the AB can
evaluate the consistency of the WTO on customs unions or regional trade agreements. The
Panel in this case had determined that Article XXIV of the GATT could be used to examine
the consistency of individual measures adopted because of customs unions of regional trade
agreements, but not to evaluate the consistency of such agreements as a whole. This task,
according to the Turkey Panel, corresponded to the Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements.
Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
WT/DS34/R. (May 31, 1999)
9.52 - .53 [hereinafter Turkey - Textile Report]. These
findings were not appealed. However, the AB took the opportunity to express its
disagreement and, for practical purposes, reversed the finding. The Panel maintained:
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The second revealing silence refers to the broad impact of the
decisions on other Members' antitrust laws governing international pricing.
In some delicate disputes, when the AB desires to narrow the impact of its
decision on future similar cases, it says so explicitly, as it did in a recent
and Safeguard Measures Relating to
case, Chile - Price Band System
81
CertainAgriculturalProducts.

it is arguable that Panels do not have jurisdiction to assess the overall compatibility of a
customs union with the requirements of Article XXIV. We are not called upon in this appeal
to address this issue, but we note in this respect our ruling inIndia - QuantitativeRestrictions
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products on the jurisdiction of Panels to
review the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:B of the
GATT 1994.
Turkey - Textile Report 60.
This note is among the most important statements that the AB has made in its short
history, because it gave Panels and the AB jurisdiction to evaluate the overall consistency of
custom unions and regional trade agreements. Indeed, the reference to its report in India
meant that the analysis the AB made there applied in its entirety to the Turkey case. The
dispute settlement proceedings of Article XXIII were available to determine the justification
of balance-of-payment measures imposed pursuant to Article XXVIII, and such
determination was not exclusive of the General Council or of the Committee on Balance of
Payments. India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
87, 102, 103, 106, 108 [hereinafter
Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R. (Aug. 23 1999),
India - Quantitative Restrictions AB Report]. Thus, the examination of the overall
consistency of customs unions or regional trade agreements was not a matter exclusive to a
WTO political organ, namely, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, but for Panels
and the AB as well. Both decisions were highly controversial, because some saw them as
the AB's encroachment on the competences of WTO political organs. See Frieder Roessler,
The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Political Organs of the WTO at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/Conferences/trade/roessler.htm (last visited March 4, 2004).
In favor, see William J.Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement Exceeded Its Authority? A
Considerationof Deference Shown by the System to Member Government Decisions and Its
Use of Issue-A voidance Techniques, 4 J. OF INT'L EcoN. L. 79, 85-88 (2001); Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court:" Some Personal
Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. OF
WORLD TRADE 605, 633-34 (2002).
The issue of trade and antitrust is very sensitive for the reasons explained above. Had
the AB thought that the above-mentioned Panel's statements had gone too far, it could have
made another note similar to that of its Turkey decision in order to reduce their scope. It did
not, and this is why such silence is another endorsement of the Panel.
81 The AB stated:

We emphasize that we have been asked, in this appeal, to examine the measure before usChile's price band system-for its consistency with certain of Chile's WTO obligations. We
have not been asked to examine any other measure of any other WTO Member. Therefore,
we need not, and do not, offer any view on the consistency with WTO obligations of price
band systems in general, or the consistency with WTO obligations of any specific price band
system that may be applied by any other Member.
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The AB could have stated that its Act Decision was limited to the Act
Decision exclusively. Nevertheless, the AB did not make such a limitation,
tacitly conveying the message that it wished its analysis to apply to other
antitrust laws.
These statements and the AB's silences on appeal demonstrate that
both the Panel and the AB would be willing to start a new trend, which
departed from the Act decisions, on competition within the WTO. This is
so because the AB risked an important portion of its institutional capital in
this case.
Indeed, the institutional capital the AB possesses to enable it to defy
the United States, or other powerful WTO Members such as the European
Communities, is not unlimited, and the AB is aware of this. Garret and
McCall claim, for instance, that when the United States or the European
Communities appear as complainants or defendants before the AB, the AB
is highly cognizant of their appearance.
Although these members'
appearances obviously does not mean that they will always prevail, the AB
sometimes adjusts its decisions to facilitate compliance, since it dilutes
opposition to the implementation of adverse rulings and enhances the AB's
institutional reputation. 82 The importance of the Act Decisions is that, in
WTO Appellate Body Report, Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating
to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R. (Sept. 23, 2002),
203. Another
narrowing of the scope of a decision can be found in the AB's report in United States Section 211 Omnibus AppropriationAct of 1998. This was a very sensitive decision, and the
AB made it clear that its report did not deal with the Member's right to expropriate
intellectual property rights without compensation. See United States - Section 211 Omnibus
AppropriationAct of 1998, WT/DS 176/AB/R. (Jan. 2, 2002), 362.
82These authors maintain that the:
Appellate Body has sharply altered the reasoning of many Panels, often interpreting WTO
rules in a manner deferential to powerful defendants. In a series of cases challenging EU and
U.S. health and environmental regulations, for example, the Appellate Body offered
guidelines on how to impose trade-restrictive policies in ways that would be consistent with
WTO obligations.
Geoffrey Garret & James McCall Smith, The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement, at

http://www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/1999-05.pdf (last visited. From a more general perspective,
Keohane and Nye support this view. They deem that the AB "is certain to take into account
political constraints and potential opposition when making its final decision." See Steve
Charnovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, 219, 237 in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:

TRENDS AND

PROSPECTS (Laurence Boisson et al., eds., 2002) (citing Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy,
264, 275 in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY:

THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM

AT THE MILLENNIUM, (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001)). But see Philip M. Nichols, GATT
Doctrine, 36 VIRG. J. INT'L L. 454 n.429 (1996) (Arguing that the fact that consensus is
required to block the adoption of Panels' and AB's reports "could create a partial de facto
independence for the Panels and the Appellate Body, which no longer must worry about
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such a delicate dispute, both the Panel and the AB decided not to show any
deference to the United States. This is despite the considerable political
significance the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress attach to its
antitrust laws. 8 3 As well as the risk of not only receiving sharp criticism or
even threats from Washington,84 but also of ending up with the WTO
judiciary's reputation impaired because of absence or delayed
implementation of its rulings (as has effectively been the case 85). The only
possible explanation for the fact that the Act Panel and the AB were
determined to face these obstacles is that they were equally determined to
begin stepping in on competition matters, albeit cautiously. Then it is fair
to say that, in general, the Act decisions were written with the view to not
only solving the Act case but also to conveying the message that the fact
that antitrust cases reach the judicial framework of the DSB should in no
way mean that self-restraint is imposed on it.
It is now time to deal with a number of possible objections to the
interpretation of the Act decisions advanced in this paper in the sense that
these rulings constitute hallmarks of the emerging, though cautious, WTO
competition jurisprudence. One might say that the Act reports are not
competition decisions but simply trade decisions. In other words, it could
not be sustained that they are competition rulings if what they determined is
that the U.S. government cannot enforce its antitrust laws. The Act
decisions are related to competition because they expanded WTO law over
a domestic antitrust issue: international predatory pricing. Therefore, a
domestic antitrust matter must be resolved through the exclusive use of
international trade law and no longer with remedies contemplated by
domestic antitrust legislation.
A second possible objection could be that, in strict terms of
competition enforcement, the Act decisions do not differ at all from the
Film Report. According to this reasoning, the latter failed to provide a
solution to the competition problem at issue-the anti-competitive behavior
in Japan-and the former established that the U.S. antitrust remedies

crafting reports that appeal to all, or even a majority, of the members.").
83 This becomes clear once one notices the reluctance of the United States to comply with
the Act rulings more than two years after their adoption by the DSB. For a more detailed
analysis of the implementation process of this dispute see infra Part VII.C. 1.
84By the time of the Act rulings, there had already been an attempt by certain Members
of the U.S. Congress to establish a mechanism for review of Panels' and AB's decisions in
anti-dumping cases. Senator Bob Dole introduced a bill, which was never passed (S.16,
104th Congress), aimed at this purpose. See Richard 0. Cunningham & Troy H. Cribb,
Dispute Settlement Through the Lens of 'Free Flow of Trade'. A Review of WTO Dispute
Settlement of US Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures, 6 J. OF INT'L ECON. L.

155, 168 (2003). Nevertheless, the AB did not hesitate to defy the United States with its Act
ruling.
85 See infra Part VII.C. 1.
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against international predatory pricing were illegal under the WTO. Thus,
both cases ended up with no domestic antitrust enforcement. How, then,
could they be deemed to have opposite approaches?
This is an erroneous interpretation of the results of these decisions. In
the Film ruling, competition enforcement was left to Japan, which is
obviously not the same as the result brought about by the Act decisions
(where the United States was not left with the choice to face international
predatory pricing). The Act rulings did not grant any discretion to the
United States; these reports unequivocally proscribed a specific type of
antitrust enforcement and mandated the use of WTO law to counteract the
aforementioned anti-competitive practice. Thus, the Act reports are at one
side of the spectrum and the Film Report at the other regarding domestic
antitrust enforcement only.
Likewise, the key point is not whether there was antitrust enforcement
but whether only WTO law must be used to solve an anti-competitive
problem. The Film Report answered the second question in the negative,
while the Act rulings did so in the positive. The second criticism fails to
grasp this difference.
IV. THE ACTIVISM OF THE NEW APPROACH CONCERNING COMPETITION
AND TRADE ISSUES: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK OF
THE DSB's JURISPRUDENCE OPENLY PROTECTING PRIVATE INTERESTS

The judicial framework of the DSB may have started to adopt a
complete view of private parties under the WTO, which could be the new
approach. Panels and the AB have backed and strengthened a line of
jurisprudence protecting private parties' interests created by past GATT
practice. 86 Thus, it is understandable that the DSB has started to recognize
that private companies may have to pay a price when using, or abusing, the
benefits of the trading system by means of anti-competitive actions that
weaken it.
A closer look reveals that the many benefits of trade liberalization pass
directly to private enterprises, which enjoy the openness of new markets
worldwide. First, while only member states are parties to the WTO, they
enter in order to enhance opportunities for their private companies and
citizens. Second, although only member states have standing before the
DSB, they usually request its intervention to protect private companies or
industries. Notwithstanding that in these cases member states are defending
their rights formally, in reality, the benefits of a DSB ruling go straight to
the private enterprises or industries involved.8 7
86 The Panel report in United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
synthesized this jurisprudence and developed further. United States - Sections 301-310 of
the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec.22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Report].
87See Bernard Speyer, Dispute Settlement: A Gem in Need of Polish and Preservation,

Emerging WTO CompetitionJurisprudence
24:441 (2004)
Finally, the confirmation of all these advantages is that the GATT
1947 and the judicial framework of the DSB, despite having before them
disputes among States, have sometimes aimed their rulings at protecting or
enhancing the ability of private enterprises in general to benefit from trade
liberalization. For instance, the Panel report in United States - Sections
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, which dealt specifically with this issue,
mentioned those topics where the need to protect private expectations have
guided Panels under the GATT and the WTO:
It is commonplace that domestic law in force imposing discriminatory
taxation on imported products would, in and of itself, violate Article III
irrespective of proof of actual discrimination in a specific case.
Furthermore, a domestic law which exposed imported products to future
discrimination was recognized by some GATT Panels to constitute, by
itself, a violation of Article III, even before the law came into force.
Finally, and most tellingly, even where there was no certainty but only a
risk under the domestic law that the tax would be discriminatory, certain
GATT Panels found that the law violated the obligation in Article III...
The rationale in all types of cases has always been the negative effect on
economic operators created by such domestic laws .... 88
Moreover, the Section 301 Report went even further concerning the place of
private corporations within the WTO framework by creating the concept of
"indirect effect" in the WTO regime by holding:
[I]t would be entirely wrong to consider that the position of individuals
is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal matrix. Many of the benefits
to Members which are meant to flow as a result of the acceptance of
various disciplines under the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of
individual economic operators in the national and global market places.
The purpose of many of these disciplines, indeed one of the primary
objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce certain market
275, 280 in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION MILLENNIUM ROUND:

FREER TRADE IN THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Klauss Ginter Deutsch & Bernard Speyer eds., 2001). The
existence of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 and the European Communities'
Regulation 2641/84, known as the "New Trade Policy Instrument," makes this point clearly.
By virtue of these norms, private companies both in the U.S. and in the European
Communities can ask their states to investigate trade practices taking place in other countries
that violate the WTO agreements, and if such a violation is considered to exist, private
companies based in the United States and Europe can exert pressure on their states to trigger
WTO dispute settlement proceedings in order to get the removal of the WTO-inconsistent
practices. See Yuji Iwasawa, WTO Dispute Settlement and Japan, 473, 484 in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON

(Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
88 Section 301 Report, note 86,
7.83-.84 (footnotes omitted).
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conditions which would allow this individual activity to flourish....
It may, thus, be convenient in the GATT/WTO legal order to speak not
89
of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of indirect effect...

Finally, the Section 301 report established that the principle of indirect
effect on private parties is one of the most important reasons to condemn
the existence of legislation granting Member States the9 -Power to impose
trade sanctions unilaterally, even before their application. 0
As can be seen, this set of decisions set forth a jurisprudence that
places considerable importance on the need to protect the interests of
private companies within the WTO, despite the fact that they are not parties
to the WTO. This jurisprudence also continually evolves to incorporate
new characteristics, as is revealed in the creation of the principle of indirect
effect in the Section 301 Report.9 1 Thus, there is a consistent and
'9

Id.

7.73 and 7.7 (footnotes omitted). The Report also displays the consequences of

this principle-the possibility of challenging legislation as such before the DSB, even before
7.80-.8 1.
any WTO-inconsistent application thereof. See id.
90 The Panel said:
[I]t may have been plausible if one considered a strict Member-Member matrix to insist that
the obligations in Article 23 do not apply to legislation that threatens unilateral
determinations but does not actually mandate them. It is not, however, plausible to construe
Article 23 in this way if one interprets it in the light of the indirect effect such legislation has
on individuals and the market-place, the protection of which is one of the principal objects
and purposes of the WTO....

[A] law reserving the right for unilateral measures to be taken contrary to DSU rules and
procedures, may - as is the case here - constitute an ongoing threat and produce a 'chilling
effect' causing serious damage in a variety of ways....

[T]here is the damage caused to the market-place itself. The mere fact of having legislation
the statutory language of which permits conduct which is WTO prohibited - namely, the
imposition of unilateral measures against other Members with which it is locked in a trade
dispute - may in and of itself prompt economic operators to change their commercial
behavior in a way that distorts trade. Economic operators may be afraid, say, to continue
ongoing trade with, or investment in, the industries or products threatened by unilateral
measures. Existing trade may also be distorted because economic operators may feel a need
to take out extra insurance to allow for the illegal possibility that the legislation
contemplates, thus reducing the relative competitive opportunity of their products on the
market. Other operators may be deterred from trading with such a Member altogether,
distorting potential trade.... The threat of unilateral action can be as damaging on the
market-place as the action itself.
7.86, 7.88 -. 90.
Id. at
91 See Section 301 Report, supra note 87.
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developing trend molded by Panels and the AB that gives them additional
advantage in developing their competition jurisprudence and forces private
parties to pay a price for benefiting from the trading system. In other
words, because of the existence and consolidation of the abovementioned
WTO jurisprudence, private undertakings abusing the trading system might
see Panels and the AB adopting decisions aimed at preventing such abuse.
Obviously, this does not mean that the judicial framework of the DSB
will transform private companies into subjects of the WTO. Rather, the
WTO will remain a regime that creates rights and obligations only for
states. However, if the right cases arrive before such a judicial body, that
body might not be deterred by the fact that its decisions may affect given
private parties and, specifically, certain anti-competitive activities in which
they are involved.9 2
V. COEXISTENCE OF THE FILMREPORTAND THE ACTDECISION
APPROACHES CONCERNING COMPETITION AND TRADE WITHIN THE WTO

The approach of the Film Report Panel will coexist with the Act
Decisions Panel as to competition matters inside the WTO for the very
reason that the former was endorsed by the AB in its report European
Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products.93 This report stated, "Like the Panel in Japan - Measures
Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, we consider that the
remedy in Article XXIII: 1(b) 'should be approached with caution and should
remain an exceptional remedy'." 94 The scope of this provision in dealing
with competition matters is extremely narrow.
However, the coexistence of the self-restraint of the Film Report ruling
and the activism of the Act Decisions rulings does not refer to two different
WTO mechanisms of access to the DSB, or that the former will apply to
non-violation nullification and impairment cases and the latter to those
brought through direct violation disputes. Rather, one could expect that the
self-restraint approach will go beyond non-violation cases because member
states did not create the WTO framework to deal broadly with such matters,
This is not to suggest that every time there is a case before the judicial framework of
the DSB involving private anti-competitive behavior and Members' direct involvement in it,
Panels or the AB will overtly or covertly use the above-mentioned jurisprudence to force the
defendant member to either eliminate or attenuate the consequences for international trade of
such private behavior. The Film Report case clearly contradicts this. There, there were
clearly identified private multinationals on the defendant side (and on the complaining side
too). Despite this, the Panel did not interpret WTO law in a way that would have forced
Japan to modify its multinationals' conduct.
92

93 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing

Products, WT/DS 135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Asbestos AB Report].
94 Id.

Paper).

10.86 (quoting Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and
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and some members would not tolerate rampant activism on the part of
Panels and the AB. As has been mentioned, the DSB is a highly political
body. 95 This imposes restrictions on Panels and the AB, as well as a need
for conservative interpretations of WTO provisions aimed at preserving the
agreement between the member states. Occasionally, Panels and the AB
feel strong enough to push WTO rules beyond what Member States
negotiated,96 as the Act Decisions rulings indicate, but this situation is an
exception.

Finally, the tension between the Film and the Act approaches are
expressed in two different ways. First, the tension may be present in single
decisions, as was the case with Bovine Hides, which left traces of both
orientations.9 7 Yet the tension may be viewed from the general perspective
of the WTO competition jurisprudence as a whole. For instance, the selfrestraint of the Film Report was first, followed by the activism of the Act
decisions. Later, the AB endorsed the approach of the Film Report in its
Asbestos decision. Finally, the Bovine Hides report was neither entirely
95 Traditional accounts of the DSB do not depict clearly all the politics involved in its

operation. First, politics might start even before consultations are requested. For instance,
members might agree not to take certain disputes to the DSB, as was the case in the dispute
between the United States and the European Communities regarding the Helm Burton Act.
Garret & McCall suggest that this agreement comprised many other disputes, but that it was
breached by the United States with its claims in European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas and EC - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products. See Garret & McCall, supra note 82. Second, the consultation stage
involves politics as well, since the parties attempt to reach an agreement. Third, politics are
present even at the Panel stage with the possibility of negotiating a satisfactory solution even
if the Panel has been constituted. Fourth, when Panel and AB reports are submitted to the
DSB for adoption, politics are involved. Members use this scenario to advance their agendas
by expressing their agreement or disagreement with the Panel or AB decision. The fact that
the DSB adopts reports almost automatically does not mean that Panels or the AB are deaf to
the debates their reports engender. Members know this and clearly state it. For instance, in
its 2002 Report to the U.S. Congress, the Secretary of Commerce expressed that the "The
United States will continue to work to communicate the United States' concern clearly to
The tools available for these purposes include
Panels and the Appellate Body...
submissions to Panels and the Appellate Body, comments on the proposed findings of
Panels, and discussions of any finding at the DSB." U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Executive
Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and Appellate Body. Report to
the Congress Transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce. Dec. 30, 2002. For a general
comment regarding the possibility of DSB's debates influencing the AB, see Steve
Charnovitz, supra note 80, at 237. Fifth, the implementation process is also full of politics,
given the discretion losing Members enjoy to adjust the given measures in order to comply
with the DSB ruling. In general, implementation also comprises negotiations between the
parties to the dispute. See Garret & McCall, supra note 82; Chy Carmony, Remedies and
Conformity under the WTO Agreement, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 307 (2002). Thus, there is
virtually no stage within the dispute settlement process lacking politics.
96 See infra note 231 for controversial rulings where the AB went beyond the texts of
WTO law.
97 See Part VI, infra.
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activist nor self-restrained. 98 Hitherto, it seems as though the judicial
framework of the DSB were trying to strike a balance between both
approaches, thereby helping WTO competition jurisprudence to evolve
without generating too much resistance.
VI. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ACT RULINGS: ARGENTINA - MEASURES
AFFECTING THE EXPORT OF BOVINE HIDES AND THE IMPORT OF FINISHED
LEATHER: THE FILMREPORTAND THE A CT DECISIONS APPROACHES
COMBINED

The first decision after the Act Decisions was the Bovine Hides Report,
which demonstrated that WTO competition jurisprudence, even that based
on direct violation, evolves among a tension between the Film and the Act
approaches. 99 The case stemmed from a European Communities claim
alleging that Argentine Resolution 2235 ("Resolution"), allowing the
presence of representatives of the Association of Industrial Producers of
Leather, Leather Manufactures and Related Products ("ADICMA"), in the
export process of bovine hides, an obviously vital output of its products,
violated Article XI(1) and Article X(3)(a) of the GATT.00
Argentina adduced that the reason for the presence of ADICMA
representatives in the export process of bovine hides was to make sure that
the tariff heading corresponded with the description of the goods and that
the duties and charges proposed were correct. 1°1 The Resolution did not
provide the representatives with the right to stop or delay shipments of
bovine hides. 10 2 In the case of disagreement between ADICMA
representatives and any given customs officer, they had
10 3 to submit a
complaint or to go before a court alleging criminal offences.
A. The Panel's Analysis of the Violation of Article XI(1).
The European Communities attempted to show that exports of bovine
hides were substantially lowered because of the presence of ADICMA
representatives in the export process of such hides. 10 4 The European
Communities argued that the Resolution constituted an export restriction
contrary to Article XI. 10 5 They argued that the Argentine tanning industry
98See infra Parts V.1 .C. 1and V.1 .C.2.
99 There is no such tension as to non-violation nullification and impairment cases. They
will be solved with the Film Report approach, now that it has been ratified by the AB in its
Asbestos AB Report. See text accompanying note 89.
100 See Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,

See id.
102 See id.
103See id.
101

3.1

3.41.
3.44.

" See id. 4.63.

105 Seeid. 93.1.
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had successfully pressed Argentina's government to set export restrictions
on bovine hides in a policy going back to the 1970s. 10 6 Initially there was a
prohibition on the export of bovine hides (1972-1979), which was then
transformed into an export tax as result of a US § 301 investigation.10 7 This
was followed by a suspension of exports (1985-1992); a new duty of 15%,
(abolished in 1993); and finally, the Resolution, contemplating the presence
of ADICMA representatives in the
10 8 export process of bovine hides, which
coexisted with another export tax.
The European Communities presented three different arguments to
contest the Resolution as violating Article XI(1). First, the mere presence
of ADICMA representatives constituted an export restriction on bovine
hides. Second, the representatives and access to confidential information on
slaughterhouses (frigorificos)10 9 implied an export restriction. Third, the
representative's access to confidential information by a cartel in the tanning
industry, operated as an export restriction of bovine hides.
As this was all circumstantial evidence, the Panel first set the standard
of proof that the European Community had to meet in order to demonstrate
aprimafacieviolation of Article XI(l). The Panel maintained that it:
[C]annot, consistently with its obligation to make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, draw inferences from the
circumstantial evidence placed on record, unless that evidence clearly
110
and convincingly sustains the complainant's suggested conclusion.
The Panel rejected the first claim (that there was an export restriction on
bovine hides because of the Resolution and of the presence of
representatives of the tanning industry) holding:
It seems to us that the exports of hides from Argentina may be lower
than what could normally be expected. This is particularly so in light of
the evident price premium that frigorificos could obtain by exporting
even taking into account the export duties. We recognize that there
almost certainly are higher costs in exporting rather than selling
domestically, although the 20 percent cited by Argentina may be too
high. There may also be some quality differences, but we do not think
the evidence supports Argentina's contention that the differences are
dramatic.... But that is not enough to show that there are export
restraints or, if there were, that this measure in dispute is the way in

106 See id.
107

11.46

See id.

10' See id.

109 The Panel

treated as synonyms the following expressions:

frigorificos, and meat-packing plant. See id. 3.2.
"o Id. 11.28 (footnotes omitted).

slaughterhouses,
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which such export restriction is "made effective."1 '

Next, the Panel went on to evaluate the second claim, that there was an
export restriction on bovine hides provoked by the presence of ADICMA
representatives within the export procedures of bovine hides, specifically,
by their access to slaughterers' confidential information. The Panel rejected
this claim:
[D]oes the revelation of this information along with the presence of
ADICMA personnel result in prohibited export restrictions? Again...
we are drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence. In the absence
of additional evidence, we remain unconvinced that releasing such
information in and of itself necessarily leads to export restrictions... 112
The Panel believed that the level of exports of bovine hides was low,
but that such a level was not explained by the presence of ADICMA
representatives or by the combination of their presence and access to some
slaughterers' confidential information.
1. The Bovine Hides Report Panel's Decision Regarding the Antitrust
Claim
Having rejected the first two claims, the Panel concluded their
analysis, by addressing the the European Communities' antitrust claim.
They asserted that there was a cartel in the Argentinean tanning industry,
whose objectives was to curb exports of bovine hides, and that slaughterers
have strong reasons not to export bovine hides for fear of losing their
domestic customers, ADICMA members. In the European Communities'
view, the113Resolution constituted the tool to make this export restriction
effective.
Here, the Panel qualified further the standard of proof regarding
circumstantial evidence. As has been mentioned, the first two claims were
evaluated with a clearly and convincing evidence standard. Here, the Panel
went further by holding that circumstantial evidence needed to be strong
enough to eliminate other reasonable alternatives explaining the facts. 1 4

...
Id. 11.29.
112 Id.
11.42.
113 See id.
11.42, 11.47.
114 The Panel maintained the following:
[W]e are in the situation described in the previous Section where we are drawing inferences
from circumstantial evidence. The question is whether such circumstantial evidence clearly
and convincingly leads us to the conclusion proposed by the complainant and, effectively, no
other....
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Thus, the standard of proof for circumstantial evidence to meet in
order to demonstrate the existence of a private restrictive practice,
comprises two steps, according to the Bovine Hides Report. First, the
evidence must lead to the conclusion that the given practice is in place.
Second, the evidence must eliminate other reasonable alternatives
questioning the existence of the private practice. 15
This standard of proof is higher than that of the objective assessment
contemplated by Article 11 of the DSU." 6 Indeed, while the AB has
prudently refrained from defining "objective assessment of the facts" with
precision, a definition that would be quite difficult to apply successfully to
all types of cases, it has indicated what "an objective assessment" is not. In
EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, the Appellate Body
stated:
[T]he deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence
submitted to a Panel is incompatible with a Panel's duty to make an
objective assessment of the facts.
The willful distortion or
misrepresentation of the evidence put before a Panel is similarly
inconsistent with an objective assessment of the facts. "Disregard" and
"distortion" and "misrepresentation" of the evidence, in the ordinary
signification in judicial an quasi-judicial processes, imply not simply an
error of judgment in the appreciation of evidence but rather an egregious

[R]easonable alternatives must be eliminated....
Id.

11.42, 11.51 (footnotes omitted).
115From the parties' perspectives, this standard of proof contemplates a defense in favor

of complaining member states. Members can posit reasonable explanations for the presence
of the circumstantial facts that complaining members mention as attributable only to the
existence of a restrictive practice, to place the burden of proof on claiming Members who
now must rebut such reasonable explanations. If they fail to do so, the Panel will assume that
a primafacieviolation has not been demonstrated.
116Article 11 of the DSU set forth:
Functions of Panels
The function of Panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities
under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a Panel
should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the
parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually
satisfactory solution.
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error that call into question the good faith of the Panel.'

In general, reasonableness is the direct result of an evaluation of fact
made in a way that does not distort, disregard, or misrepresent them. Thus,
if after having evaluated the facts of the case, a Panel reaches conclusions
that are reasonable, it can embrace such conclusions regardless of whether
there is another plausible interpretation of the same facts put forward by the
defendant Member. The conclusion must be the result of a comprehensive
evaluation, which cannot be considered a distortion or misrepresentation of
the factual situation put before the Panel."18 Article 11 of the DSU does not
impose "perfection" as the standard regarding circumstantial evidence, as
the Bovine Hides Report Panel understood. An objective evaluation of the
facts does not mean a perfect, unquestionable account of them, able to
overcome all other possible descriptions. Rather, as the AB stressed in its
above-mentioned report, the standard regarding objective evaluation of the
facts of the case means neither more nor less: a description of the factual
situation that is neither a distortion nor a misrepresentation thereof, nor the
result of a partial evaluation of the proofs. 119
120
Within the framework of this standard of proof, the Panel tacitly
established that the European Community had to demonstrate first that there
was a private restrictive practice. Second, the existence of this practice was
attributed to the defendant Member's direct involvement. Third, there was
an export restraint. Fourth, there was a causal link between the practice and
the export restriction, in this case, operating through the Resolution. 121
117

1998),
118

EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16,

133.

Obviously, save in the case of claims related to the Anti-Dumping Agreement where

by virtue of its Article 17.6(ii) Panels have to respect members' objective evaluation of facts
even if they would have reached a different conclusion. See, e.g., United States - AntiDumping Measures On Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products From Japan, WTIDS 184/AB/R
(July 24, 2001),
50-70 [hereinafter Hot-RolledSteel AB Report]. Vermulst and Graafsma
suggest that Article 17.6(ii) has had little impact on how anti-dumping cases have been
decided. See Edwin Vermulst & Folkert Graafsma, WTO Dispute Settlement with Respect to
Trade Contingency Measures: Selected Issues, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 209, 211 (2001).
"9 The Panel did not cite any previous WTO ruling in support of this approach, nor do
post-AB reports seem to adopt this line of reasoning. Indeed, one of the most recent AB
rulings on Article 11 of the DSU preserves the general view of not constraining Panels in
their evaluations of facts and law beyond what Article 11 called objective evaluation. See,
e.g., Hot-Rolled Steel AB Report, supra note at 113, 54.
120 The Bovine Hides Report Panel did not make general findings regarding the content
of the burden of proof of the case, but evaluated each of these requirements based on the
factual record of the dispute. It is then by way of inference that this author states in this
paragraph the content of the European Community's burden of proof.
121 An analysis of such requirements will be made below when exploring the different
possibilities of WTO competition jurisprudence. See infra Part VII.C.2.(a). Given that the
sole purpose here is to disentangle the Film Report and the Act Decisions approaches of the
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Regarding the existence of the cartel, nobody, neither the Argentinean
122
meat packing industry-the one most harmed by the supposed cartel nor the European Community, far away from the place of the events that
were strictly domestic in character, 123 nor the Panel, which felt that it could
not grasp the whole picture of the real facts as to the existence of an export
restriction, seemed to posses direct evidence of it, including its competition
dimension. The Panel stated:
[W]e felt that there were facts of which we were not aware and which
might be of importance and, therefore, we have not been fully satisfied
that we have had a truly comprehensive view of some aspects of the
situation. 124

On this basis, the Panel stated that there was insufficient proof of the
existence of the cartel in the tanning industry:
In our view, it is possible that a government could implement a measure
which operated to restrict exports because of its interaction with a
private cartel. ....

The evidence before us is quite thin. We have a newspaper article and
opinion piece, a press release from thefrigorificos and a statement by a
member of the Congreso de la Naci6n. Such evidence would certainly

not support a case in a domestic court. While it may be an open
question whether the same quantum of evidence is necessary to support
such allegations in a WTO dispute under Article XI of the GATT 1994,
surely the difference cannot be that great. What is clear125is that whatever
level of proof may be required, it was not reached here.'
What followed was a succession of weak evidence regarding the three
other key requirements to demonstrate the primafacie violation of Article
XI(1).
Indeed, the Panel stated that the proof of the Argentinean
Bovine Hides report it is not necessary to incorporate such analysis at this moment.
122 The President of the Argentine Meat Packers' Association (Asociaciinde Frigorificos
de la Argentina) declared: "We have no concrete evidence of the existence of market
agreements among tanners." Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3, 4.93.
123 The facts of this case differ substantially from cases where the extraterritorial
enforcement of national antitrust laws is possible. In the latter, cartels operating from
foreign countries have commercial activity in the overseas market they are injuring with
their anti-competitive behavior, which make it possible for the antitrust authorities to gather
a certain amount of information regarding what is going on in their market. In the Bovine
Hides Report dispute, the supposed tanning cartel operated only in Argentina, with no
presence at all in the European market. This made it very hard for the European Community
to clearly prove its existence.
124 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,
11.14.
25
' 1d. 11.51, 11.52.
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government's involvement with the existence of the cartel was necessaryproof not submitted by the European Community-and concluded that the
causal link between the cartel, the Resolution, and any export restriction
was not demonstrated.
[E]ven if we were to agree that there were a cartel operating in this
industry, there is simply no proof that Resolution
2235 is what is causing
126
(or making effective) the export restriction.
Finally, the Panel found that the European Community's legal
arguments had not proven the violation of Article XI(l). The Panel also
stated that Article XI itself does not impose a duty on Member States to
prevent the existence of private practices restraining exports. The Panel
said:
[T]here is no obligation under Article XI for a Member (Argentina in
this instance) to assume a full "due diligence" burden to investigate
and
27
prevent cartels from functioning as private export restrictions.'
The Panel then concluded that there was insufficient evidence of "an
export restriction made effective by the measure in question within the
meaning of Article XI(1) of the GATT 1994.128

B. The Panel's Analysis of the Violation of Article X(3)(A)
The European Community also attacked the Resolution by alleging
that it was an unreasonable and partial administration of customs law and
regulations, and thereby violated Article X(3)(A) of the GATT 1994,
according to which, "[e]ach contacting party shall administer in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and
rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.', 129 The Panel
126

Id.

11.54.

11.52. Although the Panel did not declare the existence of the cartel in the
tanning industry, it did believe that the existence of such a cartel was probable and so stated
it twice. See infra Part VI.C.2.(a).
121 Id
11.55.
129 Paragraph 1 of Article X provides:
127d.

Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made
effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products
for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements or
restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payment therefore, or
affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection,
exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as
to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements affecting
international trade policy which are in force between the government or a governmental
agency of any other contracting party shall also be published....
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upheld all the European Community's arguments regarding this claim. As
to reasonableness, the Panel said:
[i]n our view, the analysis of this issue with respect to reasonableness
then will turn on the information that is supplied to ADICMA
representatives and its direct relevance to the product classification
question. .

.

. [I]t is unreasonable to allow ADICMA representatives

into the Customs clearance process in light of the access to information
that it affords...
To provide some specific examples, ADICMA representatives should
not be able to see the pricing information of the suppliers to ADICMA's
members. This is information which ADICMA members could use to
their commercial advantage in negotiations with the frigorificos.... We
also see no need for them to be made aware of the destination or
quantities involved as these data
130 are irrelevant to the tasks ADICMA
representatives are involved in.
We think it is particularly important for the reasonable administration of
Argentina's export laws that the tanners not be provided the name of
exporters...
Therefore, we must conclude that a process aimed at assuring the proper
classification of products, but which inherently contains the possibility
of revealing confidential business information, is an unreasonable
manner of administering the laws, regulations and rules identified in
Article X: 1 and therefore is inconsistent with Article X:3(a). 131
Finally, regarding impartiality, the Panel endorsed the previous European
Community's approach and ruled that:
[A]DICMA, in fact, represents an adverse commercial interest in that
the exports are not in its members' interests as such exports potentially
drive up the costs of hides. Furthermore, ADICMA members are
competitors of the foreign buyers of the hides.
Much as we are concerned in general about the presence of private
parties with conflicting commercial interests in the Customs process, in
our view the requirement of impartial administration in this dispute is
not a matter of mere presence of ADICMA representatives in such
processes. It all depends on what that person is permitted to do. In our
130
131

For a general description of ADICMA's tasks, see supra text accompanying note 96.
Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,
11.91-.94.
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view, the answer to this question is related directly to the question of
access to information as part of the product classification process as
discussed in the previous Section ....
Whenever a party with a contrary commercial interest, but no relevant
legal interest, is allowed to participate in an export transaction such as
this, there is an inherent danger that the Customs laws, regulations and
rules will be applied in a partial manner so as to permit persons with
adverse commercial interests to obtain confidential information to which
they have no right.
[T]herefore, Resolution 2235 cannot be considered an impartial
administration of the Customs laws, regulations, and rules described in
ArticleX: 1 and, thus, is inconsistent with Article X:3(a) of the GATT
1994. 132
C. Disentangling the Approach of the Bovine Hide Panel
The Bovine Hides report is not as activist as the Act decisions; thus, it
is not easy to unravel the Panel's interpretive strategies and its approach
when deciding each claim. However, the Panel left traces of its state of
mind that make it possible to infer that the approach of the Bovine Hide
Panel is a mixture of the Film and the Act approaches.
1. Disentanglingthe Film Approach of the Bovine Hides Report
The Panel used the Film approach when deciding the antitrust claim of
violation of Article XI-and not because the Panel rejected the claim. The
antitrust claim had limited chances of success. Indeed, even if the Panel
had declared the existence of a cartel in the tanning industry, such a
declaration would not have altered the decision rejecting the antitrust claim.
Indeed, after having declared the existence of the cartel in the tanning
industry, the Panel could have gone in one of two directions, both of which
would have been rejected.
The first would be to declare that the
Argentinean government was involved in the existence of the cartel and was
therefore liable.
The second would be to say that the Argentinean
government was not involved, but that the members of the European
Community had a duty of due diligence to prevent the existence of
restrictive practices of this type. Thus, the declaration of the presence of
the cartel would have made the government of Argentina responsible.
Neither alternative was possible. First, the Argentinean government's
involvement in the existence of the cartel was not proved, so the cartel's
32 See id.

11.51.
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actions did not make Argentina liable. 133 Second, the Panel said that Article
XI does not impose a duty of due diligence on Member States to prevent the
existence of cartels restraining exports. 134 Thus, as Argentina did not have
a duty to prevent the cartel's existence in the tanning industry, declaring the
cartel's existence did not lead to holding Argentina responsible for a
violation of Article XI.
Knowing that the declaration of the existence of the cartel would not
have any meaningful consequence on the final decision, and that the whole
case would be decided on the basis of Article X(3)(a), the Panel could have
made general statements regarding the antitrust claim to establish the four
requirements that the European Communities had to prove. The Panel
could also have rejected the Article XI claim based on the lack of
Argentina's involvement with the cartel and absence of any duty imposed
on it to prevent the existence of private cartels operating as export
restraints. Instead, the Panel35 decided to increase the standard of proof
regarding the antitrust claim. 1
Sophisticated adjudicators do not speak without purpose. The Bovine
Hides Panel knew that its final decision would be the same with or without
such a high standard of proof; the Panel was also aware of the fact that by
setting this standard of proof, it would produce Film-type effects on both
future complaining Members and future Panels dealing with private
restrictive practices.
For future complaining Members, the message
conveyed by the Bovine Hides Panel is that a case dealing with a private
restrictive practice and based on circumstantial evidence must be strong to
the point where it is nearly infallible. This standard of proof makes
competition litigation harder, particularly in cases involving private
36
restrictive practices and violation of WTO non-competition provisions.
On the other hand, knowing this standard allows complaining Members to
better assess the merits of their cases and the opportunity to put them before
the DSB. Members now know that they have to gather substantial evidence
regarding the requirements to demonstrate a prima facie violation of non-

...
See id. 11.51.
134 See supra text accompanying note 122.
135 See id. and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that the burden of proof of
private restrictive practices should be lightened in WTO cases, but simply to highlight the
fact that the Bovine Hides Panel made this statement not to decide the case, but to try to
enlighten future Panels who will analyze the proof of such practices. Again, future Panels
may use this argument from the Bovine Hides Report to justify very strict requirements of
the burden of proof on claimant Members in cases involving private restrictive business
practices.
136 See infra Part VII.A. WTO non-competition provisions are those that do not deal
explicitly with competition issues, for example, Article XI. These provisions differ from
WTO competition provisions, because in the latter case, WTO law deals expressly with
competition matters. This categorization will be presented in detail below.
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competition provisions before taking their cases to the DSB.
The effects of the standard of proof in the Bovine Hides report on
future Panels can be anticipated easily. A future Panel using the Film
approach would declare that either, (1) the private restrictive practice, (2)
the government involvement, (3) the trade distortion or, (4) the causal link
between the distortion and the practice was not demonstrated. Therefore,
the result would be the rejection of the antitrust claim and the denial of the
WTO remedy for the competition problems brought forward by the
complaining Member. In other words, a future Panel using the Film
approach would be able to use the standard to justify its self-restraint.
For a future Panel employing the Act approach, this statement might
not be significant. A Panel may state that its duty is to evaluate the case
objectively, as Article 11 of the DSU orders it to do; the Panel may proceed
without any reference to such a statement, or may distance itself from the
latter by narrowing its scope to antitrust claims regarding violations of
Article XI.
In sum, the fact that the Bovine Hides Panel unnecessarily raised the
standard of proof and set a precedent that future Panels may draw on to
justify self-restraint indicates that its approach when deciding the claim of
violation of Article XI mirrors that of the Film Report. The Panel was
unwilling to provide a WTO remedy for competition complaints.
2. Untanglingthe Act Approach of the Bovine Hides Panel
(a) The Beliefs of the Bovine Hides Panel
Despite the fact that the Panel rejected the claim of violation of Article
XI(1), its report indicates that the Panel reached three significant
conclusions. The first, which the Panel referred to twice, was that exports
of bovine hides from Argentina were low. 137 The second conclusion the
Panel reached was that the existence of the cartel in the tanning industry
was possible and that it was probably a price fixing agreement. In fact, the
Panel explicitly accepted this when it stated, "[i]t is possible that there is a
cartel operating among the tanners. It is possible that they collude to set
prices." 38 However, the Panel's third conclusion was that Argentina was
not involved in the existence of this cartel, so if the cartel was limiting
exports, it was through mechanisms other than the Resolution. The Panel
expressed that "it is entirely possible to conclude that such an export
limiting cartel could operate wholly independently of this measure [the
Resolution].' 3 9
137 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,
1381 d. 11.49.
139 Id. 11.54.

11.29, 11.50.
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The Panel's belief that there was a cartel in the tanning industry fixing

prices of bovine hides and operating independently of the Resolution to
restrict exports of such hides was relevant when the Panel evaluated
whether the presence of representatives of such a likely cartel conformed
with Article X(3)(a). The analysis of this claim had a competition
perspective, 140 which played a role in the Panel's decision: the Bovine
Hides Panel sought to reduce ADICMA representatives' role in the
4 export
process of these hides, and interpreted WTO law towards this end.' 1
(b) The Claim of Violation of Article X(3) and the Act Approach of the
Bovine Hides Panel
The impact of the Panel's antitrust conclusions on the decision of the
claim of violation of Article X(3)(a) is revealing with regard to the
requirements of impartiality and reasonableness in the application of
Argentina's laws and regulations. From the text of its report, it is possible
to infer that the Bovine Hides Panel sorted out this claim using the Act
approach and sought to give it a WTO solution: reducing the scope of the
presence of ADICMA representatives within the export process of bovine
hides, for what the Panel considered was a likely anti-competitive practice.
Traces of the Act approach existed in the Bovine Hides report
rearding the declaration of WTO inconsistency of the Resolution for not
being reasonable and impartial, as ordered by Article X:3(a). This
Resolution was inconsistent because it allowed ADICMA representatives to
have access to confidential information. The Bovine Hides Panel had to
stretch the scope of Article X.1 over the above-mentioned provision to
declare such inconsistency.
140

Without this recognition, the evaluation of the claim of violation of Article X(3)(A)

would have been an exclusive matter regarding reasonableness and impartiality in the
application of Argentinean customs law and regulations.
141 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,
11.99 n.308. To be fair to the Bovine Hides
Panel, it separated its conclusion of the violation of Article XI(1) from the violation of
Article X(3)(A). In fact, when examining the latter, the Panel stated:
In this regard, we recall that we are not dealing under this Article [X(3)(A)] with export
restraints. We already decided in the previous Section that the allegations of such restraints
within the meaning of Article XI imposed through RG 2235 remain unproved. Thus, any
chilling effect with respect to the exports themselves has not been established. ...
Id.
11.99 n.308. This statement, though, does not rule out the assumption that the
evaluation of the claim of violation of Article X(3)(A) had a competition perspective. It only
indicates that the Panel is not analyzing the claim from the point of view of a Resolution
restraining exports within the meaning of Article X, which obviously does not prevent the
Panel from examining the claim from the perspective of a Resolution allowing the presence
in the export of bovine hides of a likely cartel fixing prices of such hides and operating
independently of the Resolution to stifle their exports.
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The argumentation leading to the WTO-inconsistency of the
Resolution highlighted the fact that Article X's objective, when dealing
with the duty to publish all customs regulations, was the need to allow
"[m]embers and traders to become acquainted with them."'' 42 The Panel
attached considerable importance to this goal, in favor of traders, when it
stated: "[w]hile it is normal that the GATT 1994 should require this sort of
transparency between Members, it is significant that Article X: I goes
further and specifically
references the importance of transparency to
143
individual traders.'
From this statement, the Panel began to interpret Article X:3(A),
stating that "it can be seen that Article X:3(a) requires an examination of
the real effect that a measure might have on traders operating in the
commercial world. It can involve an examination of whether there is a
possible impact on the competitive situations due to alleged partiality,
unreasonableness or lack of uniformity in the application of customs rules,
regulations, decisions, etc.' 4 4 Having said this, the Bovine Hides Panel
concluded that it did not "see why ADICMA representatives must have
' 45
access to such information, which by its nature is confidential,"'
and
46
1
unreasonable.
was
declared that on these grounds the Resolution
The previous statements permit an inference that from the duty to
publish customs regulations and the obvious consequence that such a duty
favors traders, the Bovine Hides Panels extracted a new rule:
the
application of customs regulation cannot affect the competitive situations of
traders operating in the commercial world. While it is hard to disagree with
such a rule, it is less evident that the rule emanates clearly and expressly
from Article X.3(A). On the contrary, the rule is a clever stretching of
Article X. 1 to cover the former precept.
Indeed, the very text of Article X:3(a) would explicitly not mandate
the evaluation of reasonableness, impartiality, and uniformity in the
application of customs regulations in terms of their impact on the
competitive relations of traders operating in the real world. This would be
so because Article X:3(a) refers only to Members and does not mention
traders. 47 This line of reasoning could be another possible interpretation of
142Id.

11.76.

143Id.

'44Id.

11.77.

Id. 11.91.
1 Id. 11.94.
147GATT/1994, supra note 14, at arts. X.I and X.3(a). It could be said that Article X.1
covers Article X.3(a) because the latter expressly refers to the former. The reference states
that the customs regulations mentioned in Article X.1 are the ones that must be applied in
reasonable, uniform, and impartial ways. The reference does not go beyond that. Thus, the
rule that Article X.3(a) "can involve an examination of whether there is a possible impact on
the competitive situations due to alleged partiality, unreasonableness or lack of uniformity in
141

46
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Article X:3(a), which could find solid grounds in the well-established
principle of interpretation set by the AB, according to which neither Panels
nor the AB itself can "read into the text words which are simply not
there.' 4 8 The question is, why did the Bovine Hides Panel stretch the
reference to traders in Article X.1 over Article X.3(a), despite the existence
of this WTO principle of interpretation? The answer is that the Panel's
belief that ADICMA operated as a cartel demanded such stretching. It was
a result-oriented interpretation.
Indeed, the Bovine Hides Panel believed that ADICMA was a pricefixing cartel, operating independently of the Resolution. It went even
further, openly stating, "It remains unclear to us why the tanners are the
only industry that has the right to send representatives to participate in the
Customs clearance of their suppliers' exports and for which the
Argentinean government requires such expertise."' 149 It does not come as a
surprise that the Bovine Hides Panel stretched the scope of Article X. 1 over
Article X:3(a) in order to get the result of WTO-inconsistency of the
Resolution and avoid any interpretation that, although plausible in principle,
would lead to a different result.
Thus, the first trace of the Act approach found in the decision of the
Bovine Hides Panel was the way the Panel framed the evaluation of the
claim of violation of Article X.3(A).150 This framing allowed the Panel to
make the reference to traders in Article X. 1 play a decisive role in such an
evaluation. This role is evident once one assesses this interpretation in light
of the facts of the case, but it is not in purely abstract terms.
The stretching of Article X. 1 set the stage for the declaration of
inconsistency within Article X.3(A) for lack of reasonableness and
impartiality. It is in the analysis of this latter requirement that the Bovine
Hides Panel again left evidence of its use of the Act approach.
As was seen, the Panel determined that "there is an inherent danger
that the Customs laws, regulations and rules will be applied in a partial

the application of customs rules, regulations, decisions, etc" is a rule rooted in an expansive
interpretation of Article X. 1 and X.3(a) seen together. However, their texts result in such a
rule. It is a rule created by the Bovine Hides Panel to reach an objective: declaring the WTO
inconsistency of the Resolution.
148 India - QuantitativeRestrictions AB Report, supra note 78, 94. This interpretative
principle is the expression of the prevalence of text over context in the interpretation of
WTO law, perhaps one of the most important interpretative choices the AB made to assess
the content of the covered agreements. Indeed, in the words of one of its former members,
"[a]mong these three criteria [provided in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention: namely, text,
context, and object and purpose], the Appellate Body has attached the greatest weight to the
first, i.e., 'the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty."' Ehlermann, supra note 78, at
615.
149 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,

' 0 Id.

11.76, 11.77.

11.95 n.378.
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manner so as to permit persons with adverse commercial interests to obtain
confidential information to which they have no right."' 51 The mere
presence in export procedures of a party who has conflicting interests from
exporters clearly poses the danger pointed out by the Panel, although one
cannot state that the danger is in itself inherent. However, another
dimension of the problem exists if the Panel believes that the industry
allowed to participate in the export procedures is cartelized and is fixing
domestic prices of the very same product about to be exported. In the
author's opinion, that is why the Panel spoke of an inherent danger. Put
differently, the fact that the Panel intuited the existence of a cartel probably
led to the determination that the cartel's mere presence in the export process
of bovine hides was dangerous for the impartial application of Argentinean
customs, laws, and regulations regarding the treatment of slaughterers'
confidential information.
The Panel used the Act method when it adopted a tough stance
regarding the claim of a violation of Article X(3)(a) in order to provide a
WTO solution for what the Panel thought was a likely horizontal cartel in
the tanning industry.1 52 As will be shown below, the Panel employed
hypocritical treatment regarding, first, the possible influence of ADICMA's
representatives on Argentina's customs authorities to block or delay exports
of bovine hides, and second, the possible influence of ADICMA
representatives, this time by providing tanners with slaughterers'
confidential information.
Argentinean law considered both actions
unlawful. Such unlawfulness was considered relevant by the Panel when
evaluating the first situation and completely irrelevant when dealing with
the second one, thereby allowing the Panel to consider the inherent risk of
partiality in the application of the Resolution.
The Panel considered that, given that under Argentinean law it was
unlawful for customs officials to give in to pressure by ADICMA
representatives to block or delay exports of bovine hides, it could not
presume that such a likely influence determine the existence of an export
restriction. It held the following:
It must be stated, in addition, that if an attempt on the part of ADICMA
to put pressure on the Customs officials in charge of a particular
inspection were successful, those officials would act unlawfully under
Argentinean law. However, absent evidence to the contrary, it cannot
simply be presumed that Customs officials bow to possible pressure
from ADICMA.' 53
Argentina argued that the possible influencing of Argentinean customs
151 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3, T 11.100.
152

See supra, Part VI.C.2.(a).

153 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3, T 11.31.
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officials by tanners to have the customs officials provide the tanners with
slaughterers' confidential information was also unlawful. The Panel
considered this in its report:
Argentina
European
Argentine
bis "Illicit

asserts that disclosure of confidential information, which the
Communities alleges, constitutes offences covered by
criminal law, Chapter 3 "Violation of Secrecy" and Chapter 9
enrichment of civil servants or employees.' 54

Logically, one could have expected a similar approach from the Panel,
because in both situations it was illegal for customs officials to give in to
the tanners' pressure. Hence, since it was unlawful under Argentinean law
for customs officials to bow to tanners' pressure and offer slaughterers'
confidential information, 155 the Panel could not presume any partial
application of Argentina's custom regulations to grant tanners such access.
However, in examining this claim, the Panel presumed the partial
application of Argentina's customs regulations to allow tanners to have
access to such information by calling it an "inherent danger."'' 56 The
unlawfulness of this conduct under Argentinean law was irrelevant to the
Panel.
The Panel concluded that there was an "inherent danger" after it found
that Argentina had provided information that the Panel considered private
to ADICMA representatives. 57 When the information was provided to the
158
ADICMA representatives, Argentina considered the information public,
and the Panel had yet to speak on the issue. Yet, because it subsequently
determined the information to be private, the Panel tacitly concluded that
this in itself constituted an inherent danger of partiality. 9 This is,
however, an incorrect assumption. There are two potential situations: (i)
customs officials grant ADICMA representatives access to information that
Argentina considers in the public domain at the time of its revelation, but
that later the Panel deems confidential; and (ii) customs officials grant
ADICMA representatives access to information that Argentina's law labels
114 Id. 4.76.
155 See id., Code Criminal, Ch.3, 9 (Arg.).
156 See Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,
4.74.
157 See supra text accompanying note 126. Information the Panel considered private

included slaughters' pricing information, name of slaughterers' exporters, and quantities and
destinations of exports.
158 There was in this case a debate regarding what information ADICMA representatives
had access to and whether or not it was confidential. Argentina alleged that certain
information was already in the public domain through some data bases. See Bovine Hides
Report, supra note 3,
4.74. The Panel found that certain information that Argentina

considered public, such as pricing information and name of exporters, was confidential. See
id. TT 11.92, 11.93.
159 See supratext accompanying notes.
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confidential at the time of disclosure. The first situation does not presume
the second for one simple reason. Under (i), customs official assume they
are acting lawfully, but under (ii), they know they are acting unlawfully.
The Bovine Hides Panel did not make this distinction for the same
reason that it did not take into account Argentina's unlawfulness of
revealing confidential information: the distinction it allowed the Panel to
declare the existence of the inherent danger as a matter of law and not as a
matter of fact. Thus, the Panel did not have to demonstrate that there was
evidence of Argentina's customs officials providing confidential
information under Argentinean law at the time of the revelation to
ADICMA representatives. Even though the Panel lacked evidence of
customs officials providing confidential information, it declared that such
an inherent risk existed.
The previous analysis applies to how the Panel reached the conclusion
that the Resolution did not meet the requirement of reasonableness in the
application of Argentina's customs laws and regulations. Certainly, this is
because the Panel declared that the Resolution was unreasonable given that
it "inherently contains the possibility of revealing confidential
information."1' 60 This argument is similar to claiming that the Resolution
contains an "inherent danger that customs laws and regulations will be
applied in a partial manner so as to permit persons with adverse commercial
16 1
interests to obtain confidential information to which they have no right,"'
which was the basis for declaring that the Resolution was partial.
Thus, the Bovine Hides Panel exhibited traces of the spirit of the Act
decisions. This occurred first when the Bovine Hides Panel deployed
interpretive techniques to expand the reference to traders in Article X. 1 to
cover Article X:3(a). This led to the conclusion that the competitive
situations of private traders cannot be affected by the unreasonable, partial,
or lack of uniform application of customs rules and regulations. 162 Second,
the Panel declared that there was an inherent risk of partial application of
the Resolution despite the absence of any proof of Argentina's customs
officials submitting
to representatives of ADICMA confidential
63
information. 1
The Bovine Hides Panel was reluctant to use WTO law directly against
private cartels, and it was not eager to tolerate the possible negative
influence on the impartial and reasonable application of Argentinean
customs laws of a cartel whose existence the Panel deemed likely. In this
author's view, the Panel sought to limit its impact by reducing the role
played by such a cartel within the export process of bovine hides. Because
160Id.

11.94.

161Id.

11.101.

162See supra text accompanying note 13 8.

163See supra text accompanying note 127.
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of its conclusion that the possibility of ADICMA having broad access to
slaughterers' confidential information was an unreasonable and partial
application of Argentinean customs laws and regulations, the
implementation process of the Bovine Hides report meant a significant

reduction of such access.164
Thus, the result of this case, and how it was decided both reveal a
mixture of the Film and the Act approaches.
From the European

Communities' perspective, there is unquestionable continuity between the
Act and the Bovine Hide reports. In both cases, the European Community

addresses antitrust issues and creates a WTO remedy.
Nevertheless, such continuity incorporates important differences for
164

Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3. As part of the implementation process of the

Bovine Hides report, Argentina and the European Community agreed considering
confidential a broad set of data, to which ADICMA representatives will no longer have
access:
General information: Registration number of the export destination (EC), Number/business
name and Tax Identification Number (CUIT) of: (a) the exporter; (b) the customs agent; (c)
the customs transport agent; (d) the carrier; (e) the bank involved; Means of transport;
Transport
document;
Identifier
of the
way
bill;
Name
of transport
company/registration/owner; Flag; Port of shipment; Mark and number of packages;
Packaging; Total number of packages; Gross weight; Date of shipment/time-limit;
Purpose/authorization number; Customs office of exit; Conditions of sale; Total f.o.b.
value/currency; Total freight/currency; Total insurance/currency; Guarantees; Additional
information; and Date of closure of sale.

Information concerning the goods: Total net weight in kilograms; Province of origin;
Country of destination; Statistical unit/number of statistical units; Additional information;
and Options/advantages.

Market value: Unit value in foreign exchange/unit/number of units; Total f.o.b. in foreign
exchange/dollars; Official unit price/coefficient/number of units; Documents to be submitted.

Customs value: Adjustment/deduction to be made in foreign exchange; Customs value in
foreign exchange/dollars; Temporarily imported inputs in dollars; Inputs imported for
consumption in dollars; Value of refunds

Liquidation: Amounts to be paid/collected/guaranteed and Date of closure of sale.
See Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished
Leather, WT/DS155/12, (Feb. 26 2002) at 5. ADICMA'S participation in the export process
of bovine hides was considerably diminished because of the Bovine Hides report. The report
also severely curtailed ADICMA's access to large amounts of slaughterers' information.
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the development of WTO competition jurisprudence. The Act rulings
extended the scope of WTO rules on a domestic antitrust issue. 165 This is
different from the result in the Bovine Hides report, where the Panel
provided a WTO remedy to attenuate the consequences on international
trade of a likely cartel without attempting to suppress it, if the cartel existed,
and without the intention to expand the WTO framework. Undeniably, this
result was a safe remedy for a competition problem because it did not have
to use an antitrust analysis and apply WTO law. In conclusion, an adequate
depiction of the three existing WTO competition decisions shows that the
Act approach is clearly activist, the Film approach is marked by selfrestraint, and the Bovine Hides case exemplifies the tension between those
two approaches.
Nonetheless, it is important to examine the theoretical possibilities for
future development of WTO competition jurisprudence. To depict such
possibilities, the author will present here some generalizations that depart
from the particularities of the existing competition decisions and of the
claims in the Telecommunications dispute.' 66 Unquestionably, these cases

have opened the door for the potential development of a richer WTO
competition jurisprudence, based on direct violation cases, a door that was
supposed to be closed following the Film Report.
VII. THE POTENTIAL RICHNESS OF WTO COMPETITION JURISPRUDENCE

After the ratification of the Film approach by the AB in its Asbestos
report, 167 the development of competition jurisprudence will be expected
not in non-violation nullification and impairment cases, but in violations
disputes, such as the Act and the Bovine Hides cases, brought before the
DSB through the mechanism of Article XXIII.I(a) of the GATT. 68 This

165See supra Part III.
166 See infra Part VIII. A general view of the Telecommunications case will be discussed
in the final part of this paper.
167See supra text accompanying note 90.
168GATT/1994, supra note 14, at art XXIII.I(a). This article provides, in relevant part:
1. If Any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of...
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement.. the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or
parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall
give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
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means complaining Member States must demonstrate that the given
competition situation violates specific WTO provisions, and Panels and the
AB will have to interpret the invoked precepts and ratify or reject the
alleged violation. Thus, two types of WTO precepts, WTO competition
provisions and WTO non-competition provisions, may be the subject of
violation cases and decisions.169
As will be seen, the WTO has some provisions addressing competition
matters that could be violated directly by Member States, thereby
originating a case before the DSB on the basis of Article XXIII. 1.(a). These
provisions are not uniform regarding the level of obligations imposed on
Member States, so a categorization of such competition norms is useful in
order to establish which type makes possible the development of the WTO
competition jurisprudence.
A. Types of WTO Competition Provisions
WTO competition provisions can be divided into three categories: (i)
pro-competition provisions, (ii) mandatory anti-restrictive business
practices precepts, and (iii) exhortatory anti-restrictive business practices
norms.
1.

WTO Pro-competitionProvisions

Usually, WTO precepts deal exclusively with Members' actions or
omissions, without regard for what private companies do. However, WTO
pro-competition provisions constitute the exception to this rule, because by
virtue of these decisions, Member States acquire the duty to ensure that
their private undertakings or non-governmental bodies behave in the way
set forth by the given WTO pro-competition provision. If they do not
perform so, and the given Member state does nothing to ensure the
existence of the respective private or non-governmental pro-competitive
behavior, the Member violates the respective norm, and a case before the
DSB may arise.
Perhaps the most striking examples of a WTO pro-competition

2. If not satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within
a reasonable period of time,.., the matter may be referred to the contracting parties. The
contracting parties shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned,
or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate....

169This categorization and all others that will appear below in Part VII.A., along with
their respective definitions, do not exist in WTO law and are made here to facilitate the
presentation of the hypothetical possibilities for development of WTO competition
jurisprudence.
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provision are the Annex on Telecommunications170 and the Reference

Paper. 171 Negotiated within the privatization process of the telecom
industry, 72 both require Member States to ensure interconnection with
other Members' service suppliers no matter whether the telecommunication
transport networks are privately or publicly owned. Specifically, in the case
of private ownership of such a network, the Annex and the Reference Paper
impose on Members the duty to be certain that the private owners will
ensure interconnection of their networks with other Members' suppliers "on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions"'' 73 for the supply
of a service included in the Members' Schedules. 74 The interconnection
duty must grant foreign suppliers the following three rights:
[1] To purchase or lease and attach terminal and other equipment which
interfaces 75with the network and which is necessary to supply a supplier's
services. 1
[2] To interconnect private leased or owned circuits with public
telecommunications transport networks and
services or with circuits
1 76
leased or owned by another service supplier.

[3 T]o use public telecommunications transport networks and services
for the movement of information within and across borders, including
170 Annex on Telecommunications, Annex 1B, General Agreement on Trade in Services.
WTO Legal Texts, supra note 33, at 314.
171World Trade Organization Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in

Services. S/L/20. Apr. 30, 1996 [hereinafter Reference Paper]. Strictly speaking, the
Reference Paper is not part of the Annex on Telecommunications; however, it is binding
through the mechanism of additional commitments provided for in Article XVIII of the
GATS for those Members that so decided. Fifty-three countries included the Reference
Paper within their Schedules. This was the way the negotiators avoided the tortuous path of
amendment of the GATS. See Laura B. Sherman, "Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First
MultilateralAgreement on Trade in Telecommunications Services, 51 FED. COMM. L. J. 1, 88
(1998).
172 In 1997, private companies controlled the telecommunication networks of 57 WTO
Members.
173 Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 171, at art. 5(a).
174 Reference Paper, supra note 171, § 2.5. The need to ensure interconnection when
private companies own public telecommunication networks was the basis for Section 2.5 of
the Reference Paper, according to which an independent body will evaluate claims regarding
the lack of fulfilment of the interconnection obligations set forth in the Annex on
Telecommunications and the Reference Paper, when the latter makes part of the Schedule of
a given Member. Indeed, although Article VI(2)(a) of the GATS already provided judicial
review of administrative actions, such revision was not contemplated when the source of the
complaint was private behaviour; thus, the above-mentioned Section filled this gap.
175 Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 171, at art. 5(b)(i).
176 Id. at art. 5(b)(ii).
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for intra-corporate communications... and for access to information
contained in data bases or otherwise stored in machine-readable form in
the territory of any Member.' 77
The interconnection duty provided for in the Annex on Telecommunications
rests on a major supplier, public or private, who according to the Reference
Paper:
[h]as the ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having
regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic
telecommunications services as a result of (a) control over essential
facilities; or (b) use of its position in the market.' 78
Such major suppliers must ensure interconnection of their networks with
other Members' telecommunications providers according to the following
criteria: non-discriminatory terms and conditions, 179 interconnection within
a timely fashion,' 80 and cost-oriented and sufficiently unbundled rates. 81 It
is important to note that Members have the WTO duty to ensure that their
private major suppliers provide interconnection with foreign suppliers
according to the parameters set by the Annex and the Reference Paper. The
absence of the exact type of interconnection envisioned by the WTO
constitutes a violation of the respective Member's WTO obligations under
the Annex and the Reference Paper.
2. MandatoryAnti-restrictiveBusiness Provisions
By virtue of mandatory anti-restrictive business provisions, Member
States have the obligation of preventing the existence of the restrictive
business practice set forth by the respective WTO norm. Member States
violate this obligation when they are aware of the existence of the restrictive
practice but do not eradicate it. To use the expression used in the Bovine
Hides report, this sort of WTO provision imposes on Member States a due
diligence duty to prevent the existence of the given restrictive practice. 182
The first example of this type of WTO competition norm is Article
VIII(2) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This
precept stipulates that:
[w]here a Members' monopoly supplier competes, either directly or
through an affiliated company, in the supply of a service outside the
177 Id. at art. 5(c).
178

Reference Paper, supra note 171.

1 See id. § 2.2(a).
180 See id. § 2.2(b).
181
182

See id.
See Bovine Hide Report, supranote 4,

11.52.
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scope of its monopoly rights and which is subject to that Member's
specific commitments, the Member shall ensure that such a supplier
does not abuse its monopoly position8 3to act in its territory in a manner
inconsistent with such commitments.1
It is important to highlight that the due diligence duty imposed by
Article VIII(2) involves public or private monopoly suppliers, by virtue of
the definition of this term in Article XXVIII(h) of the GATS:
For the purpose of this Agreement:

(h) "monopoly supplier of a service" means any person, public or
private, which in the relevant market of a territory of a Member is
authorized or established formally or in effect by that Member as
the sole supplier of that service. 184
A second example of WTO mandatory anti-restrictive business
provisions is Article 1.1 of the Reference Paper. The Reference Paper sets
forth the "definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the
basic telecommunications services," and in the above-mentioned provision
establishes the following:
Prevention of anti-competitive practices in telecommunications:
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of
preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier
from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices.
There is, then, a clear duty of due diligence on the part of Members to
prevent major suppliers of basic telecommunications services, either public
or private, from practicing anti-competitive behavior.
3.

ExhortatoryAnti-restrictive Business Provisions

Not all WTO competition provisions set forth obligations on Members
concerning the given competition issue. There are other exhortatory
character provisions that provide only for a duty to evaluate other
Members' complaints about certain anti-competitive practices, thus
excluding the obligation to either prevent or eliminate the respective
183 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex IB; WTO Legal Texts, supra note 33, at 293.
184 Id. at 306.
185 Reference Paper, supra note 171.
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practice. Indeed, Article 40 of the Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") exemplifies this third category of
WTO competition precepts.
After Member States recognized in Article 40(1) that certain licensing
practices and conditions linked to intellectual property rights hampering
competition might affect trade, Article 40(3) required Member state's
respective intellectual property owner to evaluate any claim of the other
Member state regarding such an owner's practices, without the WTO
obligation of suppressing them. These norms stipulate:
Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses
Members agree than some licenses practices or conditions pertaining to

intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have adverse
effects

on trade

and

impede

the

transfer

or

dissemination

of

technology....
3. Each Member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any

other Member which has cause to believe that an intellectual property
right owner that is a national or a domiciliary of the Member to which
the request for consultation has been addressed is undertaking practices
in violation of the requesting Member's laws and regulations on the
subject matter of this Section, and which wishes to secure compliance
with such legislation, without prejudice to any action under the law and
to the full freedom of an ultimate decision of either Member. The
Member addressed shall afford full and sympathetic consideration to, an
shall afford adequate opportunity for, consultations with the requesting
Member, and shall co-operate through supply of publicly available nonconfidential information available to the Member, subject to domestic
law and to the conclusion of mutually satisfactory agreements
conceming the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting
Member.'7
Thus, there are WTO competition provisions that are exclusively
exhortatory in their condemnation of the existence of certain private anticompetitive behavior.

186 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. WTO Legal Texts,
supra note 33, at 321.
187 WTO Legal Texts, supra note 33, at 338-39.
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B. Development of WTO Competition Jurisprudence through Violation
Cases of WTO Competition Provisions
On appeal, Panels and the AB will find a more favorable environment
to provide a WTO solution to the given competition problem when they
have violation cases based on either WTO pro-competition and WTO
mandatory anti-restrictive practice provisions.' 8 The very existence of this
type of provision, on which respective decisions can be based, removes
many of the political hurdles that a Panel and the AB face when deciding a
competition case.' 89 Under these circumstances, complaining Member
States, the given Panel, and the AB do not bear the heavy burden of proof
required to demonstrate that the WTO covers the particular competition
issue. WTO competition jurisprudence based on pro-competition and
mandatory anti-restrictive practices provisions usually should not trigger
concerns regarding an imbalance of power within the whole structure of the
DSB. To use Trachtman's words, Panels and the AB have by virtue of
these provisions, "textual authorization"' 90 to embark on the development
of WTO competition jurisprudence.
Some would argue that what I call pro-competition provisions are not
antitrust matters, because they deal with market access and not with anticompetitive behavior. Thus, any jurisprudence regarding them cannot be
However, WTO anti-restrictive
labeled competition jurisprudence.
practices and pro-competition provisions share certain features that make it
WTO
possible to group them together under a broader category:
competition precepts. First, WTO law usually aims at regulating Members'
behavior exclusively, 191 because only States are parties to the WTO. What
their private companies undertake within their territories is not a matter of
concern for WTO law. This is not the case for WTO pro-competition and
anti-restrictive practices provisions, wherein Members have the obligation
to promise that their private companies will behave in the way stipulated by
the given provision. There is a specific mandate on Members regarding
private behavior taking place within their territory. This is the opposite of
188Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, May, 1969, art. 31, available at http://
www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treatfra.htm. It is clear that exhortatory anti-restrictive practices
provisions cannot constitute the basis of a violation case, and the judicial framework of the
DSB will not have in principle the opportunity to render a decision based on them.
However, the role of exhortatory competition provisions is to interpret others, when possible,
by virtue of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
189Violation cases of pro-competition and mandatory anti-restrictive practices provisions
may find a more favorable environment for a WTO solution, but this does not mean that they
will always get one. All depends on the particularities of the specific case, the strength of its
facts, and the legal arguments used, among many other factors.
190See Trachtman, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
191See WTO Agreement, supra note 33, at art. XII; WTO Legal Texts, supra note 33, at
12.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

24:441 (2004)

the structure in the majority of WTO norms, where only State behavior is
determinant of compliance. 92 Therefore, these precepts are the only two
exceptions to the general type of WTO norms.
Second, both classes of provisions seek to enhance competition
regarding specific types of private companies. Pro-competition provisions
order Members to make sure that a given pro-competitive private behavior
exists, while anti-restrictive practice precepts compel Members to prevent
their private companies from undertaking anti-competitive actions in certain
domains. Thus, these two similarities justify the inclusion of the abovementioned type of WTO
norms under the wider category of WTO
93
competition provisions. 1
1.

Legislation Violating WTO Competition Provisions

The analysis thus far has shown that the first branch of WTO
competition jurisprudence consists of violation cases of WTO competition
provisions. However, this analysis can be taken one step further. There are
two situations that could lead to violation of WTO competition provisions:
(1) municipal legislation inconsistent with WTO competition provisions
and, (2) factual practices contrary to WTO competition precepts.
(a) Legislation Violating WTO Pro-competition Provisions
Legislation violating pro-competitive WTO provisions occurs when a
legislation enacted by a Member state prevents the existence of the procompetitive behavior stipulated in the WTO norm. The United States
claims that this type of violation exists in the Telecommunications case:
Mexican basic telecom service suppliers will not make private leased
circuits available to their foreign counterparts to provide cross-border
facilities-based services into Mexico. Indeed, the ILD ["International
Long Distant Rules"], together with other Mexican law and regulations,
prevent Mexican firms from doping so.' 94
The evaluation of any claim that legislation violates a WTO law in this
192 See GATT 1994, supra note 14, at art. XXIII.
193 1 am well aware of the fact that WTO law has a bearing on competition. This is
because, as the U.S. International Competition Policy Committee pointed out, "the basic
nondiscrimination principles of national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, and

transparency that compose the foundation of the WTO support the operation of impartial
competition policy regimes." U.S. International Competition Policy Committee, supra note
29. Obviously, this does not mean that all trade jurisprudence will become competition
jurisprudence this way, because what distinguishes these principles from the here-labeled
competition provisions is the fact that it is private behavior that determines whether
Members are complying with these provisions.
194Telecommunications Case, supra note 4, at 3.
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manner involves analysis that goes beyond the text of the specific
legislation at issue. The Section 301 report established that in claims of this
type, "internal elements legally relevant to the construction of the
legislation should be determinative"' 95 and that the elements of national
laws are often inseparable and "should not be read independently from each
other when evaluating the overall conformity of the law with WTO
obligations."'' 96 Additionally, the Act Panel report specified that among
such internal elements are the domestic application of that law, its historical
context and legislative history, and subsequent declarations of the
Members' authorities.197 Finally, it is also important to keep in mind that
this entire process is relevant only when WTO law permits the existence of
administrative discretion, because there may be situations, as the Section
301 report established, where even such discretion is prohibited by the
relevant WTO agreement.' 98 Thus, all the elements must be taken into
account in order to demonstrate that legislation violates a WTO procompetition provision.
(b) Legislation Violating WTO Mandatory Anti-restrictive Business
Provisions
WTO competition jurisprudence develops when domestic legislation
precludes a Member state from preventing the adoption or maintenance of a
given anti-competitive behavior by its public or private enterprises. This
violation may happen in two circumstances: (i) the accused legislation
mandates private or public enterprises to adopt the practice that the WTO
provision condemns; r99 or (ii) such legislation2°° expressly authorizes public
or private undertakings to adopt or maintain such a conduct. In both
situations, the respective Member state cannot fulfill its WTO obligation of
195Section 301 Report, supra note 86,
196

7.114.

Id. 7.27.

197 See Act Panel Report, supra note 3, 9 6.48.
198 See Section 301 Report, supra note 86, 99 7.53, 7.54; see Act AB Report, supra note
3, 99 n.59. The AB tacitly endorsed this type of situation in its Act Report. For a complete
analysis of this whole issue, see Sharif Bhuiyan, Mandatory and DiscretionaryLegislation
under the WTO, 5 J. OF INT'L. ECON. L. 571 (2002).
199Telecommunications Case, supra note 4, at 3; see infra texts accompanying notes 221-

22. That would be the case, for instance, if a Member enacts legislation mandating its major
suppliers of basic telecommunication services to engage in certain anti-competitive behavior
aimed at preventing other Members' suppliers from providing these services in the former's
market. This legislation would be inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the Reference Paper,
which orders Members to respond appropriately to impede major suppliers from engaging in
behavior of this sort. This is one of the United States' claims in the Telecommunications
case.

200 This legislation is unlikely in reference to post-WTO domestic legislation, but
hypothetically possible regarding pre-WTO national legislation.
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preventing the existence of the given restrictive practice, and a dispute
before the DSB may arise.
There is a third possibility: absence of legislation condemning the
behavior expressly contemplated by the WTO mandatory anti-restrictive
It is possible that domestic legislation does not
practice provision.
condemn the restrictive practice, making it necessary to enact a new
domestic law. The absence of such new legislation also precludes Member
States from preventing the existence of the given restrictive practice,
because if the practice is adopted or maintained, Members do not have laws
Clearly, this omission will violate not only the
to eliminate it.
correspondent WTO mandatory anti-restrictive practice provision but also
Article XVI.4 of the WTO Agreement ordering all Members to "ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.",20 Hence, given the
existence of WTO competition provisions imposing obligations on Member
States to eradicate certain restrictive behavior, there is always a possibility
that national legislation, or its utter absence, may violate such competition
provisions, thereby becoming an issue for the DSB to solve.
2. ParticularBehavior Violating WTO Competition Provisions
(a) Particular Behavior Violating WTO Pro-Competition Provisions
Cases where particular behavior opposes WTO competition provisions
arise when a Member state does not allow the specific pro-competitive
private behavior that the foregoing provisions order Members to ensure.
This occurs in the Telecommunications dispute. There, the United States
maintained that "Mexico's measures fail to ensure that Telmex provides
interconnection to U.S. cross-border basic telecom suppliers on reasonable
rates, terms and conditions ....

,202

The burden of proof on complaining Members under this circumstance
differs from the traditional requirements of WTO jurisprudence.
Traditionally, GATT and WTO jurisprudence have mandated that in order
to declare a Member liable for the behavior of its private undertakings, the
other side must prove that the existence or maintenance of the respective
private behavior is the direct result of the Member's actions. 20 ' For
201WTO Legal Texts, supra note 33, at 14.
202 Telecommunications Case, supra note 4, at 2.
203 See Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductor, BISD 11/188, May 4, 1998,
Semi-Conductor Panel Report].

102 [hereinafter

Among the private practices that have been declared

"governmental" is the export control put in place by private Japanese producers of semiconductors in order to export their products at prices not below company-specific costs. The

Panel on Japan- Trade in Semiconductors found that this export decision was not the private
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example, the Panel report Japan- Trade in Semiconductors affirmed that:
First, there were reasonable grounds to believe that sufficient incentives
or disincentives existed for non-mandatory measures to take effect.
Second, the operation of the measures to restrict export of
semi-conductors at prices below company-specific costs was essentially
dependent on Government action or intervention. The Panel considered
each of these two criteria in turn. The Panel considered that if these two
criteria were met, the measures would be operating in a manner
equivalent to mandatory requirements such that the difference between
the measures and mandatory requirements was only of form and not of
substance. 2°
This jurisprudence was ratified by the Panel in the Film Report, which
pointed out the following:
[P]ast GATT cases demonstrate that the fact that an action is taken by
private parties does not rule out the possibility that it may be deemed
governmental if there is sufficient governmental involvement with it. It
is difficult to establish bright-line rules in this regard, however.20 5Thus,
that possibility will need to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
However, particular behavior violating pro-competition provisions are
the first exception to this rule. In fact, there is a due diligence duty imposed
on Member States to ensure the performance of the given specific actions
by private undertakings. Thus, even if there is no direct governmental
involvement, there is a breach of the provision when private companies do
not adopt the pro-competitive behavior set forth by the WTO norm, and
their Member States do nothing to ensure the companies' performance.
In consequence, to demonstrate a prima facie violation of a procompetition provision, the complaining Member must prove, first, that there
is behavior by a private undertaking in the defendant Member state's
territory and, second, that such private behavior does not correspond to the
one the given WTO pro-competition provision orders Members to adopt.20 6
Proof of the defendant Member's direct involvement is not required. Once
this burden of proof is met, the defendant Member must refute the existence
of the violation by demonstrating that the private behavior accords with
what the provision prescribes.
This does not mean that defendant Members' direct involvement will
exporters' autonomous determination but the result of the Government of Japan's
administrative structure designed to exert pressure on such producers in order to ensure that
exports were not made at prices below the foregoing cost.
204 Id.
109.
205 Film Report, supra note 2,
10.56.
206 See Telecommunications Case, supra note 4, at 2.
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never be present in this type of competition case. In fact, if the private
behavior provided for in the respective WTO pro-competition provision is
not in place because the defendant Member is encouraging or mandating its
private companies not to adopt the given behavior, the complaining party
can provide the proof of that, as the United States has tried to do in the
Telecommunications case. The United States alleges in that case that
Mexican measures permit Telmex not to adhere to the private behavior
ordered by the GATS and Mexico's schedule of commitments.2 °7
(b) Particular Behavior Violating WTO Mandatory Anti-restrictive
Practices Provisions
WTO mandatory anti-restrictive practices provisions impose a due
diligence duty on Member States to prevent the existence of the given
practice, making the presence itself of the restrictive behavior the violation
of the given WTO provision. One example of this type of competition case
is already before the DSB. In the Telecommunications case, the United
States maintains that:
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper requires Mexico to maintain
appropriate measures to prevent Telmex from engaging in or continuing
anti-competitive practices. The United States considers that Mexico has
not fulfilled this commitment.2 °8
The burden of proof in this type of case is similar to that in cases of
particular behavior contrary to WTO pro-competition provisions. Indeed,
Member States do not need to be directly involved to violate the mandatory
anti-restrictive practice provisions; the lack of fulfillment of the due
diligence duty to prevent the existence of the given restrictive practice
means a breach of the respective WTO provision. However, Members may
furnish proof of why the restrictive practice is in place.20 9
It is important to highlight that although the proof of the defendant
Member States' involvement is not required does not mean that the burden
of proof is easy to fulfill. Complaining Members have to demonstrate, first,
that there is a private restrictive practice in place and, second, that it
corresponds with the one provided for by the WTO mandatory antirestrictive practice provision.
In summary, the first source of cases leading to the development of
WTO competition jurisprudence may stem from direct violation of WTO
207

See id.

208

Id. at 5.

209

See id.

This is similar to what the United States has tried to do in the

Telecommunications case by claiming that the anti-competitive behavior at issue is in place
by virtue of Mexican legislation.
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competition provisions, specifically; pro-competition and mandatory antirestrictive practices norms. Any of these precepts can be violated by
legislation or by particular situations. There is, however, a second source of
cases able to generate WTO competition jurisprudence: disputes involving
direct violation of WTO non-competition provisions.
C. Competition Cases of Violation of WTO Non-competition Provisions
The Act and the Bovine Hides decisions demonstrate that using WTO
competition provisions is not the best way to resolve out antitrust issues
since creative interpretations of precepts that in principle have no bearing
on such issues may also achieve the same result.
1. Antitrust Legislation Violating as Such WTO Non-competition Norms
As the Act decisions show, antitrust legislation may be opposed to
WTO non-competition provisions.
However, determining what new
competition issues will be covered by non-competition provisions, thus
preventing antitrust legislation from regulating them, is uncertain, because
it is a matter only for the judicial framework of the DSB to decide based on
Members' competition disputes. Regardless, the ongoing expansion of the
WTO framework, along with the possibility of new interpretations of
existing WTO norms, might increase the chances of allowing WTO noncompetition provisions to cover areas traditionally occupied by domestic
antitrust legislation. It would be unwise to disregard this area of potential
development for WTO competition jurisprudence started with the Act
rulings.
However, among the key aspects that Panels and the AB must assess
before declaring a piece of antitrust legislation violates a WTO noncompetition provision, is the possibility of implementation of the rulings
and recommendations adopted by the DSB. '0 The Act case has revealed,
by the United States' reluctance to implement the recommendations of the
DSB in this dispute, how the evolution of WTO competition jurisprudence
may face problems in the implementation phase.
More than two years after their adoption, the United States has yet to
implement the recommendations of the DSB. First, an arbitrator appointed
pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSB 211 determined that the reasonable
210 See Garret & McCall, supra note 82. As Garret and McCall argue, the AB is aware of

the fact that the implementation of its reports is one of the key aspects of the building of the
reputation of the judicial framework of the WTO, and sometimes adjusts its decisions to
facilitate compliance with them.
211 The rule mandates:
At a DSB meeting held within 30 days after the date of adoption of the Panel or AB report,
the Member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of
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period for implementation of the Act rulings was ten months from the date
of adoption of the Act decisions.2 12 This date (September 26, 2001) passed
without the U.S. Congress enacting legislation repealing the Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916.213 On February 19, 2002, pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSB,
at the request of the European Communities, three arbitrators were
appointed to decide the level of suspension of concessions that the
214
European Communities and Japan may impose on the United States.
Although the arbitration proceeding was suspended due to an agreement
between the parties when the U.S. administration introduced a bill in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives repealing the Act, on
September 20, 2003. These proceeding resumed at the request of the
European Communities, given the absence of new developments regarding
the repeal.2 15 On February 24, 2004, the arbitrators issued their report
authorizing the European Communities to suspend obligations under
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement against imports from the
United States.21 6
Certainly, political circumstances made it difficult for the United
States to bring the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 into conformity with Article
VI of the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.217 However, these
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately
with the recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period
of time in which to do so. The reasonable period of time shall be: ...
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date
of adoption of the recommendation and rulings. In such arbitration, a guideline for the
arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time to implement Panel or Appellate
Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of the
Panel or Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer,
depending upon the particular circumstances [internal citations omitted].

World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, art. 21.3(c).
212 World Trade Organization, United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14, Feb. 28, 2001 at 17. [hereinafter Act
Article 21.3 Arbitration], available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/WTOARB/2001/

2.html.
213 World Trade Organization, United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. Recourse by
the European Communities to Article 22.2 of the DSU. WT/DS136/15, Jan. 11, 2002 at 1.
214 Id.; Note by the Secretariat. WT/DS136/17, Feb. 19, 2002.
215 United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Recourse by the United States to Article
22.6 of the DSU Communicationfrom the Arbitrators, WTIDS 136/19 Sep. 29, 2003.
216 World Trade Organization, United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916. (Original
Complaint by the European Communities). Recourse to Arbitration by the United States
8.1, 8.2.
under Article 22.6 of the DSU Decision by the Arbitrators. WT/DS136/ARB,
217 See Act Article 21.3 Arbitration, supra note 198, 44. The election of a new U.S.
Congress and a new President in the year 2000 had an effect on this situation, and the
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circumstances no longer exist, and the delay in repealing the Act 2 18 indicates
that the United States is not satisfied with what it appears to regard as a
WTO intrusion in its domestic issues.
In conclusion, cases of legislation violating WTO non-competition
provisions are among the least likely to receive a favorable Panel and AB
ruling, for the decision comprises the expansion of the WTO framework
over the given antitrust matter. Nevertheless, as the Act decisions illustrate,
those cases have merit.
2. ParticularRestrictive Practices Violating WTO Non-competition Norms
In cases where particular restrictive practices violate WTO noncompetition rules, there is a specific anti-competitive situation provoked by
determined private parties, which affects international trade. Here, the
complainant Member state tries to interpret existing WTO non-competition
provisions to get a WTO remedy for the restrictive practice. This type of
case has two general approaches: (i) complaining Member States seek the
elimination of the restrictive practice; or (ii) they pretend to limit some of
the trade distortions that the restrictive practice is producing, without
affecting its existence.
(a) Violation Cases of Non-competition Provisions Aimed at Eliminating
the Restrictive Practice
When faced with a specific anti-competitive behavior violating a WTO
non-competition norm, the first alternative that a complaining Member has
is to pursue the complete elimination of the restrictive practice. Although
the European Community did not ask the Panel to eliminate what it
considered a private restrictive practice in the Bovine Hides case,2t 9 the
Panel made important statements regarding the burden of proof wholly
relevant to this type of claim.
(i) Burden of Proof
The first step for complaining members to assert that a Member is
violating a non-competition provision is to demonstrate the existence of the
given private conduct. 220 Circumstantial evidence will be at the core of the
case to demonstrate the existence of the given anti-competitive behavior,
arbitrator recognized this by setting a period that lasted until into the year 2001.
218 See id. 34. The European Communities, Japan, and the United States have agreed
that this is the only way to comply with the Act decisions.
219 The European Communities asked the Panel to declare that the Resolution, not the
cartel itself, was WTO inconsistent.
220 See Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,
11.42, 11.47. The European Communities
tried to fulfill this first step in the Bovine Hides case.
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absent other proofs not readily available before WTO Panels. Hence, the
context of the respective anti-competitive practice and its effects will be
among the facts available to make the inference about the presence of the
practice. 221
The second requirement is to provide evidence of defendant Member
States' direct involvement. Such involvement might either be the result of
mandating the restrictive practice or of creating enough incentives for
private undertakings to adopt and maintain it.22 2 Without this proof, the
facts remain that the restrictive business practice operates wholly
independent from the given Member state, which will not be liable. The
Bovine Hides report is an example of this. As mentioned, the European
Communities were trying to use Article XI(1), a WTO non-competition
provision, to solve the problem of what they considered a cartel in the
tanning industry restricting exports of bovine hides. There, the Panel
expressed the following:
In our view, it is possible that a government could implement a measure,
which operated to restrict exports because of its interaction with a
private cartel. Other points would need to be argued and proved (such
as whether there was or needed to be knowledge of the cartel practices
on the part of the government) or, to put it as mentioned above, it would
need to be established that the actions are properly attributed
223 to the
Argentinean government under the rules of state responsibility.
Proving the existence of a private restrictive practice, and the Member
state's involvement, is the first part of the burden of proof. Nevertheless, it
is insufficient to demonstrate a primafacie violation of the WTO provision.
It is necessary to demonstrate, as the third part of the burden of proof, the
existence of a trade distortion and that the distortion is attributable to the
given private anti-competitive behavior. 4 The Bovine Hides report stated:
[I]n the context of an alleged defacto restriction ... it is necessary for a
221 Specifically, WTO Panels and the AB may not have access to proofs directly obtained

from executives of companies party to the restrictive practice when they decide to co-operate
with certain powerful antitrust enforcers, such as Canada, the European Union, and the
United States, pursuant to their leniency programs. These programs usually incorporate a
duty of confidentiality that would prevent the disclosure of the information obtained. For
Canada see http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/l/ct01990e.html; for the European Union, see
http:europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/leniency, and for the United States, see http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal.htm.
222 See Semi-Conductors Panel Report, supranote 203, and text accompanying note 190.
223 Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3, 11.51.
252-53. This is an exception to the
224 See, e.g., Bananas AB Report, supra note 32,
well-established principle that to make a primafacie case of violation of WTO law it is not
required to demonstrate actual damage. The reason for this exception is to demonstrate that
the private restrictive practice is intemational in character and not exclusively domestic.
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complaining party to establish a causal link between the contested

measure and the low level of exports. In our view, whatever else it may
involve, a demonstration of causation must consist of a persuasive
explanation of precisely how
225 the measure at issue causes or contributes
to the low level of exports.
(ii) A ComparisonRegardingthe Burden of Proof
A simple comparison between restrictive practices violating, first,
WTO anti-restrictive practices provisions and, second, WTO noncompetition precepts, shows that the burden of proof in the former is lighter
than in the latter. In the first type of dispute, the core of the case is a
demonstration of the existence of the restrictive practice. It is not required,
as is the case with particular situations transgressing WTO non-competition
norms, to certify the existence of the respective defendant Member's
involvement or the trade distortion produced or the causal link between
both.22 6
(b) Violation Cases of Non-competition Provisions Aimed at Attenuating
the Trade Effects of Restrictive Practices
Sometimes, if restrictive practices cannot be proven in their entirety, or
if one or more of the above-mentioned requirements of proof are not met, it
may still be possible to use WTO non-competition provisions to reduce
some of the effects while leaving the private practice intact.
The European Communities successfully did this in the Bovine Hides
case, when the Panel attenuated the possibility of some negative
consequences on international trade of a restrictive private practice that the
Panel did not say existed but considered likely. 227 Finally, the use of noncompetition provisions to attenuate the consequences of private restrictive
practices is viable so long as Member States adopt measures that, although
they have no bearing on the existence or maintenance of the practices,
facilitate the operation of the given anti-competitive behavior. Those
measures can be a subject matter for the DSB, as occurred with the
Resolution in the Bovine Hides case.228
D. Broad Picture of the Possibilities for Development of the WTO
225

Bovine Hides Report, supra note 3,

11.21.

See Telecommunications Case, supra note 4, at 5. For instance, when claiming in the
Telecommunications case that Mexico is violating Article 1.1 of the Reference Paper, the
United States is simply trying to demonstrate the existence of the private restrictive practice.
This Member did not argue that the practice provoked or caused a trade distortion.
227 See supra Part VI.C.2.(a).
228 See supra Part VI.
226
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Competition Jurisprudence
Table 1 illustrates the potential richness of such WTO competition
jurisprudence.229

VIII. THE CLAIMS IN MEXICO- MEASURES AFFECTING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Having analyzed the Act decisions and the Bovine Hide report and
presented the possibilities for development of the WTO competition
jurisprudence, it is important to analyze an ongoing competition case:
Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services.
The dispute
seeks to open the Mexican telecommunications market of $ 12 billion to
U.S. companies, a market still dominated by Telmex-the former
monopoly supplier, now a private company. The complaint is divided into
four different claims:
(i) The United States argues that the rate charged by Telmex to U.S.
companies interconnecting their calls with Mexico's is unreasonable, not
cost-oriented, and not sufficiently unbundled, given that the rate
includes charges for network components that U.S. companies do not
require to offer cross-border facilities-based services or commercial
agency services.
(ii) The United States alleges that Mexico's measures do not grant U.S.
basic telecommunications suppliers reasonable and non-discriminatory
access to its public telecom networks and services. According to this
claim, Mexico's law and regulations violate Sections 5(a) and (b) of the
Annex on Telecommunications, because the former norms prevent
Mexican basic telecom suppliers from making private leased circuits
available to foreign suppliers to provide cross-border facilities-based
services in Mexico. Additionally, the United States alleges that such
preclusion also exists when foreign suppliers want to provide domestic
or cross-border basic telecommunications services as commercial
agents, namely, when foreign suppliers provide telecom services over
lines they lease from facilities-based suppliers.
(iii) In the United States' view, Mexico's measures do not provide
national treatment to U.S.-owned commercial agencies. The United
States believes that Mexico's telecommunications legislation prevents
foreign-owned commercial agencies located in the United States or
Mexico from obtaining private leased circuits or from connecting them
to foreign networks, thus making it impossible for such companies to
229 See Table: WTO Competition Jurisprudence, infra p. 511.
230

Telecommunications Case, supra note 4.
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provide these services in Mexico and across its borders.
Such
preclusion does not exist for Mexican facilities-based telecommunications service suppliers, which are able to lease to each other
for cross-border and domestic telecom services and can connect the lines
they lease to foreign networks so as to furnish such services. On this
basis, the United States concludes that such different treatment is
inconsistent with Mexico's commitments under Articles XVIII: 1,
XVIII:2, and XVIII:3 of the GATS.
(iv) Finally, the United States deems that Mexico's measures do not
prevent Telmex from engaging in anti-competitive practices. The last
claim in this case is an antitrust one and consists of two arguments.
First, Mexico's norms grant Telmex the possibility of engaging in
monopolistic practices regarding interconnection rates for cross-border
basic telecommunications services and endow the company the greatest
portion of the revenue obtained because of this charge, no matter how
many calls Telmex interconnects from abroad. Second, the United
States alleges that Mexican legislation, by providing that Telmex has the
exclusive authority to negotiate the interconnection rate that not only
Telmex itself but all other Mexican suppliers will charge to foreign
suppliers to interconnect telephone calls from outside Mexico, creates a
cartel, because other Mexican suppliers must incorporate the rate
negotiated by Telmex into their interconnection agreements with foreign
basic telecommunications suppliers. The United States deems that by
doing so, Mexico violates Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper.231
A categorization of each of these claims reveals that the first is a claim
of a particular behavior violating a WTO pro-competition provision. The
second is a claim of legislation as such violating the above-mentioned type
of WTO norms. The third is not a competition claim but one related to
traditional GATT and WTO national treatment disputes. Finally, the fourth
involves a claim of a particular behavior and a claim of legislation opposing
WTO mandatory anti-restrictive practices provisions.
This is, based on the provisions alleged violated, the least troublesome
of all the previous competition cases. First, concerning the claims that deal
with the violation of WTO pro-competition and mandatory anti-restrictive
practice provisions, the Panel and the AB, on appeal, will be applying WTO
law to issues already incorporated within the WTO framework.
Consequently, providing a WTO remedy to the competition issues of the
Telecommunications complaint will likely be seen as the normal application
of what Members agreed upon in the Annex on Telecommunications and the
Reference Paper.232 Second, the burden of proof is less heavy than in any

231
232

See id.
Charges to the judicial framework of the DSB of adding to or diminishing the rights
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other competition complaints, because it is based on violation of WTO procompetition and mandatory anti-restrictive practices provisions. 3 Third,
the Telecommunications Panel might draw on other international practice
regarding interconnection in telecommunications in order to ground its
ruling. 23f
The presence of these factors does not signify that the
demonstration of the prima facie violation by the United States is an easy
task, because it is not.235 This is the first case based on the Annex on
Telecommunications, and this poses additional difficulties regarding how
the Panel and the AB will assume the task of providing content to the set of
broad terms contained in the Annex and in the Reference Paper.236 Despite

and obligations of WTO membership, based on Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU would be
unlikely.
233See supra Parts VI.B.2(a) and (b) for an analysis of the burden of proof in claims
involving factual practices violating WTO pro-competition and WTO mandatory antirestrictive practices provisions.
234 During the negotiations of the Reference Paper some countries, specifically
the United
States and the members of the European Union, incorporated terminology already existing in
the US Telecommunications Act and the EU Interconnection Directive, hoping that this
would allow WTO Panels to make use of the past experience regarding interconnection in
these countries. See Sherman, supra note 160, at 61.
235 Rohlfs and Sidak have recently shown the type of problems that the United States
must overcome in order to succeed in international telecommunications disputes. These
authors criticize the policies and methodologies that the United States is pursuing or
defending, by showing how they have been strongly questioned in the United States and how
they cannot be transferred easily to other markets. These authors maintain the following in
relation to the United States and Japan dispute related to interconnection rates in the
Japanese market, but which is also wholly applicable to the Telecommunications case:
[F]or more than six years, many American experts on telecommunications policy have
disagreed whether American consumers have benefited from the very FCC policies that the
USTR would have Japanese regulators emulate. The USTR's initiative appears to ignore that

the transition to cost-oriented rates for interconnection and retail telecommunications
services has been a difficult and unfinished process in the United States; that the cost models
used by the FCC to set interconnection prices have significant deficiencies; that actual
interconnection prices both within and outside the United States diverge considerably from
the estimates of the FCC's cost models; that variations across countries in the prices of inputs
have a significant effect on the costs of interconnection; and that, with respect to depreciation
in particular, regulators treat this cost differently .... Such substantive economic
considerations suggest why the FCC's policy in this area has generated continuous litigation,
including two Supreme Court cases since 1996, and consequently is too unresolved at this
point in the American experience for the United States to force on its trading partners.
Jeffrey R. Rohlfs & J. Gregory Sidak, Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The
United States-JapanNegotiations on InterconnectionPricing,43 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 317-18
(2002).
236 The negotiators of the Reference Paper expressly avoided defining certain terms
regarding interconnection, such as reasonable, timely, cost-oriented, economic feasibility,
and sufficient unbundled, in order to leave the determination of their meaning in the hands of
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the fact that the alleged violated norms are WTO pro-competition and
mandatory anti-restrictive practices provisions, there is room for either the
Film or the Act approach or a combination of both. Finally, the economic
stakes in this case are high, and so is the likelihood of appeal. Thus, it will
be interesting to see how the AB gauges the reactions to its Act report and
the rest of the WTO competition jurisprudence, and how it uses its
Telecommunications ruling to respond to them.
IX. CONCLUSION

WTO competition jurisprudence is slowly emerging, and its theoretical
possibilities for development are rich. This jurisprudence began to emerge
with the Panel decision in Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer
PhotographicFilm and Paper237 and the ratification of its approach by the
AB in European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContainingProducts, 238 and it continued with the Panel's and AB's reports
in United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916239 and the Panel report in
Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hide and the Import
of Finished Leather.240 Finally, it will have the next ruling in the
forthcoming
241 Panel report Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications
Services.
This paper delved into the analysis of these decisions in order to
present the major trends in the existing WTO competition jurisprudence as
a whole: first, the self-restrained trend, following the lines and spirit of the
Film Report, and second, the activist approach set forth by the Act rulings.
After the ratification of the Film approach by the AB in its Asbestos
report, the development of competition jurisprudence will not be expected
in non-violation nullification and impairment cases, but in violation
disputes, such as the Act and the Bovine Hides cases, brought before the
DSB through the mechanism of Article XXIII. 1(a). Panels and the AB on
appeal will find a more favorable environment to provide a WTO solution
for the competition problem when they have violation cases based on WTO
pro-competition and WTO mandatory anti-restrictive practice provisions.
Indeed, the sole existence of a provision of these sorts removes many of the
political hurdles that a Panel and the AB face when deciding a competition
case.
The judicial framework of the DSB may be starting to have complete
view of the place that private parties occupy within the WTO, and this
dispute settlement. See Sherman, supra note 160, at 80.
237

See supra note 2.

238

See Asbestos AB Report, supra note 93.

239

See supra note 3.

240

See supra note 4.

241 See

supra note 5.
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complete view could be at the origin of the new Act approach. Indeed,
Panels and the AB have backed and strengthened a line of jurisprudence

protecting private parties' interests created by past GATT practice.142 Thus,
it is understandable that the judicial framework of the DSB has started to
construct with the Act rulings another course, in which it simply recognizes
that private companies may have to pay a price when using, or abusing, the
benefits of the trading system by means of anti-competitive actions
weakening it.
The Act decisions also indicate that the judicial framework of the DSB
seems to consider that, nearly a decade after its creation, it has enough
legitimacy to be less conservative regarding competition matters under
certain exceptional circumstances, all while maintaining its traditional
prudence when interpreting WTO precepts. In fact, the Act approach in no
way means that self-restraint is over regarding competition within the WTO
and that WTO Panels and the AB will not be the ones providing solutions to
all kinds of international competition issues. Furthermore, the coexistence
of both approaches is marking the evolution of the WTO competition
jurisprudence at both levels: at the level of specific decisions, as the Bovine
Hides Panel report betokens, and at the level of the jurisprudence as a
whole, taking together all the existing rulings.
Finally, the circumstances seem favorable for some competition cases
appearing before the DSB and thus for the development of WTO
competition jurisprudence.
The U.S. administration opposes the
incorporation of competition within the WTO,243 and without this support,
any agreement is difficult to envision in the near future. Therefore, some
Member States, like the European Communities and Japan, may want to
incorporate competition issues within the WTO framework and do their
best to continue, under the current WTO limitations, to present some
competition cases in WTO terms before the DSB. WTO competition
litigation may become an alternative for the absence of or deadlocked
negotiations.
Viewed from a more general perspective, such limited activism in
competition matters is another expression of two wider processes that are
taking place in and outside the WTO. Within the WTO, it is clear that the
AB is determined to enhance its institutional powers and, in general, that of
the WTO judiciary. Its Act report was issued a few months after two highprofile decisions: Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products,244 and India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, where the AB showed not
only activism but also a lack of fear of clashing with the WTO political
242 See supra PartIV.
243 See International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, supra note 29.
244 WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999).
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bodies, openly defying WTO Members.245 Judges challenge conventional
wisdoms in order to strengthen their reputation. 46 Their only question is
finding the right time to do so. The first years of the operation of the Panel
system and AB have brought about a general recognition of sound legal
reasoning and results, and the feeling of success marks the great majority of
evaluations. Now, with a secure place in the world trade arena, the AB
seems to consider that it can safely embark upon a certain activist path
when it thinks it is necessary for the trading system.
This phenomenon is wholly consistent with another pattern emerging
in international law, that analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper: the
increasing importance and activism of international tribunals. As Sands
maintains, the creation of regional and global judicial institutions during the
last two decades has generated new scenarios for international litigation,
that's direct result is that "this new judiciary has taken life of its own and
has already, in many instances, shown itself unwilling to defer to traditional
conceptions of sovereignty and state power. ' 247 Thus, AB's activism is
embedded in this wider and undergoing international pattern. What we can
expect from it is not bold and reiterated AB's decisions pushing the limits
of the WTO judiciary's jurisdiction and of WTO law, but rather a wellgrounded activism carefully chosen in terms of timing and subject matter,
245

One could state that the period from October 1998 to 2001 marked a turning point in

the institutional life of the AB. In general, before October 1998, the AB was doing its job
without taking risks too often. From this month, and during the next two years, the AB
embarked on open activism and was testing how far it could go in interpreting WTO law.
We suggest that this period started in October 1998 because it is the time when the AB
issued its report in United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products where, as is widely known, it acknowledged the possibility for private parties to
submit amicus curiae briefs and the discretion for Panels to accept them or not. See WTO
Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
100-10. Later in October 1999
Products WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12 1998)
came the above-mentioned AB's report in Turkey - Textile (supra note 63), and India Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (supra
note 63). A year later, the AB rendered its Act report (Oct. 2000), and five months later
issued another controversial report in European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India (WTO Doc WT/DS 136/AB/R (March. 12
2001) declaring that zeroing, a well-established practice in the application of anti-dumping
laws in Canada, the European Communities, and Unites States, whose effect is to increase
dumping margins in most cases, was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This is
by far the most controversial decision regarding the foregoing Agreement, and it upset these
powerful Members. For an assessment of this report, see in favor, James P. Durling,
Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures, 6 J. OF INT'L.
ECON. L. 125, 136 (2003). But see against, John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An
Exercise in Trade Law Legislation?, 6 J. OF INT'L. EcoN. L. 113, 118-20 (2003).
246 See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Private Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 518, 588 (1986).
247 Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33
N.Y.U J. INT'L L. & POL. 527, 553 (2001).
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along with more traditional interpretations of the covered agreements whose
end result is the steady emergence of a reputed and powerful WTO
judiciary.
Table: WTO Competition Jurisprudence
Type of
Mechanism
of Access to
DSB

Type of
WTO
Norm
Invoked as
Violated

Direct
Violation of
WTO norms
[Act, Bovine
Hides, and
Telecommun
ications
cases]

Type of WTO
Competition
Norm Invoked
as Violated

Type of Situation
Violating the WTO
Norm

WTO procompetition provisions
[Telecommunications
case]

Legislation as such
violating WTO procompetition
provisions. [Telecommunications
case]

Direct
Violation
of WTO
norms

Competitio
n Norms
[Telecommunica
tions and
Bovine
Hides
cases]

Particular Behavioral
p violating WTO
Pro-competition
provisions [Telecommunications
case]
WTO mandatory
anti-restrictive
practices
provisions [Telecommunications
case]

Legislation as such
violating WTO
mandatory antirestrictive practices
Provisions [Telecommunications
case]
Particular Behavior
violating WTO antimandatory restrictive
practices
[Telecommunications
case]
Antitrust legislation
violating WTO noncompetition
provisions [Act case]

Objective
of the
Claiming
Member

Burden of
Proof

Existence of
legislation
preventing the
presence of the
required procompetitive
private
practice,
Absence of the
required procompetitive
private
practice, No
government
involvement
required.
Existence of
legislation
condoning the
existence of a
private
restrictive
practice (PRP).
1.Presence of
the given PRP.
2. Proof of the
government
involvement
with the PRP is
not required.
To demonstrate
that the given
antitrust issue
is covered by a
WTO noncompetition
nrovision.
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Direct violation of non-WTO
competition norms [Act case]

Specific private
restrictive practices
violating WTO noncompetition
Provisions [Bovine
Hides case]

Eliminating
the PRP.

Existence of a
PRP.
Government
involvement
with the PRP.
Trade distortion
Causality
between 2-3.
[Bovine Hides
case]

2.
Attenuating
the effects
of the PRP
[Bovine
Hides case]
Nonviolation
nullification
and
impairment
cases [Film
and Asbestos
cases]

(1) if the
practices is a
government
measure;
(2) if so,
whether the
given measure
related to a
benefit
reasonably
anticipated to
accrue from
prior tariff
concessions by
upsetting the
competitive
relationship
between
imports and
domestic
products; and
(3) if the
benefit
accruing to the
complaining
Member is
nullified or
impaired by the
measure
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